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Preface 
My father says 
Love your homeland 
My homeland is 
Divided into two 
which part should 
I love?1 
With simple clarity, this poem by Turkish Cypriot poet Neshe Yashin poses the painful question 
which the inhabitants of the small Mediterranean island of Cyprus have been confronted with and 
forced to consider after the division of the island in 1974. The territorial division has been legitimized 
by Turkish Cypriot leaders and Turkey as a necessary result of the cultural division between Greek and 
Turkish Cypriots even before 1974 and the former’s attempt to dominate the others. Disregarding 
questions of right and wrong in this matter, historical records show that great human losses resulted 
from the violent outbreaks from 1964-1974. Displacements and dispossession and killings forced 
civilians to participate in a complete change in the pattern of settlement in the entire island. A US 
research team recorded the following scenario of the human crisis resulting from this demographic 
game: 
the humanitarian crisis confronting over 282,000 Cypriots---nearly half the 
population of the island---who are now refugees, civilian detainees, prisoners of 
war, or others in need of humanitarian assistance, on both sides of the uncertain 
cease-fire line2.   
The overall result of the violence was that the majority of villages throughout the island had 
historically been relatively mixed, but was increasingly ethnically cleansed and finally the entire island 
was separated in two sectors3. In 1983 the “ethnic landscape” of Cyprus was as close to complete 
division as can be imagined: 
 (..) there are now only 829 Greeks in the north--mainly in two villages in the 
Karpas. There are about 130 Turks in the south. (..) 
                                                 
1 By the Turkish Cypriot poet Neshe Yashin who is involved in cross-border conflict resolution in Cyprus (publishing year 
unknown). A Greek Cypriot composer put music to the poem in 1979 and the song is now well-known in both sectors of the 
island (Batchelder 2004).  
2 United States Senate (1974) 
3 United States Senate (1974) and Kliot & Mansfield 1997:499-500.  
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With these small exceptions what has in effect happened as been the 
transformation of the island into two mono-ethnic zones, with an impassable (to 
most Cypriots) barrier between them running across the island and right through 
the middle of the walled city of Nicosia4.  
While we cannot confirm the exact number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots living “outside their 
sector” today, the overall demographic pattern has not changed. In April this year, the Annan Plan gave 
the population in both sectors the opportunity to abolish the antagonistic politics which have lead to the 
current state of affairs. This did not happen, however, and one could ask why this was not the case. 
Since we do not have the possibility to listen directly to the views of the people “in the field”, we have 
no intention to guess the motivations of those who voted no. Instead, this report identifies some of the 
conditions that lead to this chance and clarifies how this Plan could affect the situation we have 
outlined above. Last, but not least, we shall review how it suited the political leaders of the two sectors 
who have both been involved in the politics of conflict during the past 3-4 decades
                                                 
4 Keith Kyle 1983:4 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivations 
Our first interest was to analyse UN policies about the conflict management. We think that is 
necessary to work with a single case, which can show also the historical trends in UN policies and 
actions. We have chosen Cyprus as a case because it is a relatively stable situation in comparison to 
other current conflicts, and UN created a new plan for the resolution of the conflict having the chance 
to choose the policies without strong time restrictions. Furthermore, the referendum, which was a 
particular part of the plan, ended up with a result against the UN proposal, bringing consequences for 
the entry of Cyprus into the EU. 
 
1.2 The United Cyprus Republic 
The spring of 2004 has been a time of intense political activity and debate on many levels of 
society among the 775.000 people living in Cyprus, which were caused by the correlation of two events 
of major importance for the shape of the future political and cultural life on the island. As the date for 
the entry into EU of the Republic of Cyprus came closer, actors from the international systems of both 
EU and UN pushed for a resolution of the conflict of power sharing in the island which has effectively 
divided the island into two political units since 1974. The territorial division of the island’s 9.250 km2 
now represents a cultural and political division between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and the 
finalisation of the division has been sought through a constitutional redefinition of the territorial and 
political relations between these two groups.  
The ultimate test of the success of this attempt and the will of the population to terminate the 
division was given at the twin referendum held on 24th of April. Majority votes in favour of adopting 
the new constitution on both sides of the present ceasefire line and border, the Green Line, were 
necessary for the implementation of a new constitution for the United Republic of Cyprus. Thus the 
twin referendum together constitute a key event that has exposed many layers of political and cultural 
tensions and political developments both internally in the two sectors and between them. As students at 
a department of Geography, we choose to focus on the layers which relate to the conflicts over control 
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of territory and on UN strategies for managing and settling these conflicts, and in the following, we 
shall elaborate the thematic implications of this focus.  
 
1.3 Cyprus as a “space for intervention” 
The mentioned conflicting groups are of Greek and Turkish affiliation respectively, and leading 
politicians representing the two groups have fought over the distribution of power between them since 
the island was declared independent from British rule in 1960. They have used both methods of 
conventional politics and violence to secure their own interests on several occasions. While Greece and 
Turkey are international actors who have actively participated in both methods to support the interests 
of their respective cultural ’fellows’, UK has also maintained its access to influence on the island’s 
geo-political status after the formal decolonisation. The influence of these three actors has proven 
crucial in relation to both the outbreaks and containment of violence since 1960. The above-mentioned 
division of the island is the direct result of the intervention of the Turkish army, which occupied nearly 
40% of the territory and has since been present to secure the territory and existence of the Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus. As a consequence of this ongoing conflict, UN has effectively been a 
permanent presence in Cyprus since 1964 with the purpose of preventing further outbreaks of violence 
and upheaval as those occurring between 1963 and 1974.  
From a political geographical perspective, we find that Cyprus thus has represented what can be 
termed a ’space for intervention’ in the sense that third party intervention has been implemented in 
order to stabilise tensions and protect the civil population against hostile attacks. Coining the term 
’space for intervention’ has the aim of asking how Cyprus can be perceived as a territory in which there 
are conditions motivating and legitimising the direct intervention of UN personnel from different 
branches of the organisation. Moreover, it implies that we expect that the concrete form of the 
intervention indicate how UN perceives and defines the conflict and how dominant social, political and 
cultural understandings underpin this perception. The term is thus intended to function as an analytical 
concept, which can be used to explore the strategies by which UN has intervened, in particular the 
referendum as a recent strategic development, but the term is also intended to unfold the interests 
affecting the events and situations that make Cyprus a so-called space for intervention.  
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While this perspective will enable us to discuss the politics of the referendum held in April this 
year, we can combine it with the conceptual framework of ethnic stratification, which aims to expose 
the interplay between ethnic and socio-economic factors in areas of conflict. Rupesinghe outlines a 
classification system for the evaluation of intra-state ethnic relations, which we can use to review the 
Cyprus situation, if we assume that the island constitutes a geographical entity that forms the scene for 
the political play of defining political-spatial structures in this particular place. Rupesinghe focuses on 
the types of political systems or conflicts that can result from different ways of political and the socio-
economic organisation of the ethnic groups5. According to this we can perceive the political 
organisation of the two major ethnic groups, Turkish and Greek Cypriots, at the time of the referendum 
as highly segmented in both their political and socio-economic organisation, and any inclination 
towards more reticulate models are restricted by the heavy presence of Turkish military. 
1.4 The twin referendums 
In recent years, UN have been involved in the work for a political reunification of the divided 
island in the United Republic of Cyprus. The organisation has been actively involved in writing the 
draft constitution of the republic with the aim of establishing a legal-foundational compromise between 
the goals of Greek and Turkish Cypriot political leaders respectively. The work has been carried out 
within the framework of the so-called Annan Plan, which covers aspects from the constitution over the 
adjustment of the border to the creation of a new flag and national anthem for the suggested united 
republic. One decisive aspect of the plan has been the decision to have simultaneous referendum in the 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot areas, which has given the Cypriot population the power to adopt or reject 
the draft constitution. The referendum did not result in the adoption of the draft constitution and 
establishment of the republic, as was hoped by both UN and EU representatives involved in the matter. 
In the Northern sector, the population voted a convincing 64.8% “Yes” to the constitution, but a 
majority of 75.6% voted “No” in the Southern sector, thus preventing the further implementation of the 
Annan Plan.  
Interestingly, both the presidents who functioned as chief negotiators tried fiercely to persuade 
their constituency to vote “no”, and we believe that the aspects showing the power distribution between 
                                                 
5Rupesinghe 1996:15-18 
A Failed Attempt of Conflict Resolution: The Case of Cyprus 
 
 9
the two groups can show how the plan failed to get the support of the leaders and consequently of the 
people, at least in the Southern sector. Therefore, we have formulated a hypothesis which has 
functioned as a guide line for our work: 
 
The Annan plan was not able to achieve a real transformation of the conflict between the 
projects of the Cypriot political leaders in terms of identity and management of the territory.  
 
We shall base our final discussion of this hypothesis on answers to the following research 
questions: 
• How does the Annan Plan differ from previous forms of UN intervention in Cyprus? 
• Why did the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus from 1960 not function as a mediator 
of the interests of Turkish and Greek Cypriots? 
• What were the arguments of the political leaders engaged in the negotiations of the 5th 
version of the Annan Plan? 
1.5 Method 
1.5.1 Space for intervention 
We wish to use the term ’space for intervention’ to outline a political geography approach to the 
analysis of conflicts, which we can use when examining the Cyprus conflict. The intention is to 
formulate an approach which can be used to identify linkages between spatial structures of power and 
concrete actions in affected places. The first question is how to define a conflict. A realistic conflict 
theory model tells that “the conflict is primarily the result of incompatible interests or competition for 
scare resources (including territory) and of groups’ or nations’ attempts to maximize their positions”6. 
Focusing more specifically on protracted conflict in a multi-ethnic society, the former Secretary 
General of International Alert, London, Kumar Rupesinghe presents a very inspirational, albeit general 
definition of the concept which will form the basis of the further conceptualisation of the ’space for 
intervention’: 
                                                 
6 Rasmussen and Lewis J., Peacemaking in International conflict, page 35 
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In the most general terms, I would suggest that we see conflicts as collisions 
between projects. Projects are sequences of actions directed towards a goal. 
Conflicts occur when the projects of different actors start impinging on each other 
(Rupesinghe 1996:24-25)     
It is clear from this definition that conflicts can occur at different levels of social and political life 
and take different forms, but this does not imply that they are random incidents which cannot be 
analysed systematically or scientifically. On the contrary, the definition allows us to discern the points 
and sequences of collision between the projects of interest groups, and depending on the level and form 
of their occurrence we can categorise them according to their conflictual stage and from that it is also 
possible to recommend different types of international intervention, following Rupensinghe’s 
argument. He thus sets up a scheme designating phases in conflicts and appropriate means of 
intervention: 
1. formation   - early warning; 
2. escalation  - crisis intervention; 
3. endurance  - empowerment and mediation; 
4. improvement - negotiation/problem-solving; 
5. transformation - new institutions and projects 
(Rupesinghe 1996:26) 
We shall not elaborate here on the different forms that each phase of conflict or type of 
intervention can take, as we later focus on the relevant issues in our specific investigations of the 
Cyprus conflict. The scheme should, however, indicate that conflict management and particularly the 
resolution of conflicts consists of political, social, and military actions and is not attainable through 
military measures alone. Along the same line, Rupesinghe’s approach stresses the need to address 
problems of endemic violence and the lack of democracy in many societies, which are engaged in 
protracted conflict (Rupesinghe 1996:23). From a political or cultural geographical perspective, we find 
that a central question must be posed in the application of the definitions and measures in Rupesinghe’s 
scheme, namely that of how its scope as well as its cause is determined and how the lines of a conflict 
are drawn.  
These questions, we assume, are instrumental to the actions taken by the primary actors as well as 
third parties or the international system. E.g. talking about the Cyprus conflict in terms of geo-strategic 
politics of security may lead to the conclusion that other measures are necessary to dismantle the phase 
of conflict escalation than if the conflict was talked about and interpreted as a case of ethnic conflict. 
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Thereby, defining the conflict also becomes an aspect of power struggle that identifies the parties and 
alliances made and leading to questions of whom and how collisions of projects are articulated as 
conflicting and in need of certain kinds of intervention. This also means asking who formulates and 
promotes the colliding projects and not least how are they legitimised in this process. This approach 
should also nuance the realist definition of conflict, because the incompatibility of certain interests 
depends on how interests and projects are defined. 
Concretely, this means that a ”spot” on a world map is delimited and defined as a place where 
every day lives have been disrupted for certain reasons and that some political actors furthermore find 
it necessary to reorganise this every day life in certain ways in order to prevent further violent 
incidents. Other actors will seek to maintain this state of disruption until their goals are achieved or 
even for the mere sake of profit maximising. Maps will be pulled out of closets and placed on tables; 
ideas for how to separate or disarm more or less centrally organised, militant groups will be discussed 
as well as ideas for how to manoeuvre the people inhabiting the spot on the map so as to prevent lives 
from being lost.  
This image of decision makers gathered around the map on the table is probably highly outdated, 
but it can still serve to illustrate that both the definition of conflict and the decision making related the 
threat or outbreak of violence are to a great extent about control. Control over the distribution of 
people, political power, and means of violence in a specific place, which is constructed as a particular 
kind of space in processes of communication and military or humanitarian dispositions at national, 
international, and local level; a space for intervention. This claim is founded on a relational 
understanding of the concepts of space, which means that we view space as constructed through the 
social action of people. Holt-Jensen explains that  
(..) agents orientate themselves both in the physical and social world by means of 
‘mental maps’. On these mental maps agents mark out the positions and paths by 
which they can achieve their goals. The physical world forms fixed points (for 
instance, ‘home’ and ’workplace’) for social interactions, whereas the social world 
forms a spatial frame of reference through dimensions such as ‘religion’, ‘science’, 
’language’ (..) (Holt-Jensen 1999:148) 
This distinction between the physical and social world parallels what we called the delimited 
place of the conflict and the space for intervention above. This means that the concept of space can be 
used to discern the structural issues at stake in the development of a specific conflict, such as whether 
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or not the disintegration of the state is a risk to be assessed, or how socio-cultural parameters are 
activated in different ways by interest groups as “true” political markers of the place in ethnic conflict. 
Apart from the basic fact that conflicts themselves are played out in concrete places, ethnic conflicts as 
discussed by Rupesinghe furthermore incorporate the problem of the place directly in the conflict 
because whatever their concrete form, they always imply struggle over the definition of the relation 
between people and the place which is fought over. And in the process of determining the space for and 
measures of intervention, defining a conflict in a particular place as an ethnic conflict also means 
setting some specific limits such as which landscape can be affected by the conflict and how 
extensively; which people can or should be given a voice in the resolution of the conflict; and how 
power can be most viably or justly distributed between interest groups operating in this particular place. 
Thereby, we can also adopt Holt-Jensens explanation of place as  
(..) an epistemological contextual reality that is found in human actions and 
everyday life. People live their lives locally, but their consciousness is formed in 
and by different spatial contexts. (Holt-Jensen 1999:148).  
This means that e.g. cultural components such as language and religion are components in the 
spatial context which can be articulated with different effects. As such, they can be either inclusive or 
exclusive factors in the legitimation of a certain political system which is negotiated in the phase of 
transformation to structure and depoliticise the future interactions between people in the places which 
are determined to function under this spatial structure. This certainly does not mean that interest groups 
not operating ’on the ground’ in a particular place cannot be influential, but it means that in the 
analysis, such groups will be positioned according to the way they try to influence the determination of 
the space for intervention.  
From these delineations of our approach to investigating the Cyprus conflict, we have created a 
model showing the actors who from different places can affect both the definition or redefinition of and 
the concrete developments or interventions in the space for intervention:  
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Figure 1.1 The Space for Intervention 
 
As a general model for analysing conflicts, the model is very open in terms of the level and 
different fora that these processes (can) take place in, because that is specifically what the model is 
supposed to open up for clarifying. The purpose of this openness is to have a flexible model that can be 
used to specify who claim and determine that a given situation constitutes a space for intervention and 
what the concrete effects of such a statement are. Related to this is also the question of the significance 
of who makes this statement, i.e. which actors voices weigh heavier than others in the given situation. 
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We find that the model can function as an initial map to analyse a tense or militarised situation, and 
then it is of course possible and necessary to focus on a selection of aspects from the model. This can 
either be done by focusing on the topic of one of the 4 clusters of the model, or by selecting an 
intersection between aspects from 2 of the clusters in order to investigate e.g. the link between Greece’s 
financial support to the UN-force deployed in Cyprus and the position expressed by Greek leaders up to 
the referendum on the adoption of the draft constitution for the United Republic of Cyprus. Since this 
formulation of the “space for intervention” is clearly somewhat tentative and touches upon questions of 
both epistemology and methodology, we shall briefly discuss how useful the model has been from an 
analytical point of view in the final conclusion of the report. 
1.5.2 Empirical materials 
We cannot have unofficial information and speeches especially about UN and the Cypriot 
politicians, and therefore we will primarily work with Annan Plan and other documents which are 
publicly available. Concretely, this means that our empirical material is a combination of different 
types of texts related to the Annan Plan and the UN role in Cyprus. Concerning the role of UN on the 
island, our primary sources consist of reports of the Secretary General, resolutions of the Security 
Council about the mission as well as budgetary report from UNFICYP. The comparison of the power 
distribution between the Annan Plan and the constitution of 1960 is based on the main articles of the 
two legal documents dealing with parliamentary representation of the two communities and similar 
issues. This has been supported by maps as well as selected statistics on key data about the two sectors. 
In the analysis of the statements of the politicians, we use a speech by Papadopoulos and a statement by 
Denktaş which present their viewpoints in different ways.  
Collecting the primary empirical material, we have faced certain difficulties because we have 
lacked access to statistical material about the people, particularly about demography and detailed 
referendum results. This has been a problem especially in the Northern sector.  
1.5.3 Remarks about our vocabulary 
When we refer to Turkish or Greek Cypriots as communities, we are aware that the language can 
already imply a certain point of view on the relation between them. We understand the concepts of 
ethnicity as well as national identity as social constructs which can be very powerful instruments of 
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mobilisation in political life. We do not wish to judge whether or not Greek Cypriots constitute the 
national majority and consequently the Turkish Cypriots would be the ethnic minority, or if they are to 
be considered as two communities of equal political status. This question is a crucial part of the 
conflict, and our reference to the two communities is primarily founded on the fact that there are two 
political leaders claiming to represent their respective group. In relation to this, it is not our intention 
either to imply any positioning in favour of the Turkish Cypriot political leaders advocating separation, 
when we refer to the Northern sector as TRNC or to Denktaş as the President of the TRNC, despite the 
lack of international acknowledgement of the state. We use these terms because this is how they refer 
to Denktaş refers to himself and because this is part of the conflict.   
 
1.5.4 Delimitations 
• We do not wish to discuss the ontological aspects of the concept of ethnicity, but merely use is 
in an instrumental way to discuss power distribution according to the demographic 
categorisations already used in the negotiations of the Annan Plan.  
• In order to keep our focus, we choose not to deal with Cyprus’ entrance of the EU which 
followed shortly after the referendum.  
• We are not able to work analytically and systematically with the reasons for the outcome of the 
referendum.  
• When we discuss economic issues, it is not our intention to give a full, comprehensive 
presentation of the economic problems or interests related to the plan.  
• We will not deal with any developments or events that have taken place after the referendum of 
April 2004, but we are aware that some aspects of our work regarding for instance the issues of 
property are still in progress.  
1.5.5 Structure of the work: 
In order to discuss our hypothesis, we shall structure our report around three aspects of the 
“Space for intervention” which cut across the national and international levels which the involved 
actors operate on.  
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This means that in chapter two we shall focus on the history of the intervention chosen and 
implemented by UN and particularly its form and the decisions taken by the UN about its role as 
intervening party. We shall describe the mandate of the mission given by the UN Security Council and 
show the main priorities of the UN works in Cyprus. 
 Chapter three involves the solution proposed by UN in the Annan Plan as a measure of 
intervention to transform the conflict which is supported by the Security Council. We shall analyse the 
power distribution between the two dominant ethnic groups in the island, between majority and 
minority, compared to constitution 1960. We shall also analyse how the plan dealt with the distribution 
of land between the two ethnic groups, both in relation to the territorial aspects of the plan and the issue 
of property redistribution.  
Chapter four deals with the parties directly involved in the conflict. We focus on the political 
process that circumscribed the Cypriot referendum, mainly by analysing the statements of the 
Presidents Papadopoulos (Republic of Cyprus) and Denktaş (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). 
We shall interpret their definition of secure models for ethnic stratification which is closely connected 
to their projects of controlling the territory and also managing the population’s patterns of settlement.
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2 UN MISSION IN CYPRUS 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) was established in March 
1964. It was the 8th UN peacekeeping operation to be settled, and is currently the third-oldest UN 
mission in the world.7 
UNFICYP was set up in 1964 to prevent further fighting between the Greek Cypriot and 
Turkish Cypriot communities.  
 
FROM INDEPENDENCE TO ETHNIC CLEANING:  
In the beginning of the 18 century played Cyprus strategic plan of the UK. Great 
Britain obtained the island at the Berlin’s Congress in 1878, but formally Cyprus was 
still part of the Ottoman Empire. The UK annexed the island in 1925, early of the 
started WWI., and established Cyprus as a crown colony. They built in the island two 
military basements.  
The decolonisation attended difficult negotiations about the future position of the 
Greeks and Turkish, two nations, which left near each other in the one common island 
but they hadn’t been strongly connecting.  
Cyprus became independent in 1960 with a constitution intended to balance the 
economic, political and cultural interest of both Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot 
communities. Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the former colonial power United Kingdom 
entered into a Treaty of Guarantee the basic provisions of the constitution and the 
territorial integrity and sovereignty of Cyprus. A series of constitutional crises over the 
power distribution between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots resulted, however, in 
the outbreaks of intercommunal violence in December 1963. On 4 March 1964 the 
Security Council agreed that the situation in Cyprus represented a threat to 
international peace and security. With the consent of the Cypriot government, the 
Security Council unanimously adopted the resolution authorizing the establishment of 
the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus to prevent a recurrence of fighting 
and to contribute the maintenance and restoration of law and order and return to 
normal conditions. On 15 July 1974 the situation in Cyprus suddenly and dramatically 
changed.  Turkey forcibly intervened and occupied an area in the North of the country. 
Within two days 70 000 Turkish troops had taken control of the northern third of the 
island. Around 200 000 Greek Cypriots moved from the north of the island to the 
south and around 40 000 Turkish Cypriots moved in the opposite direction.8 
                                                 
7 The oldest and still ongoing are from 1948 UN Truce Supervision Organization in the Middle East and from 1949 UN Military 
Observer Group in India and Pakistan 
8 Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping, p. 65 -71 
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UNFICYP was deployed at the end of March 1964 and the peak its total strength reached in 
excess of more than 6 000 soldiers, provided by Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom along with the Civilian Police Unit (CIVPOL) provided by Australia, Austria, 
Denmark and New Zealand.  
After the hostilities of 1974, the Mission's responsibilities were expanded. UNFICYP remains on 
the island to supervise ceasefire lines, maintain a buffer zone, and undertake humanitarian activities. 
Because the conflict escalated again between 24 July and 14 August 1974, the Security Council 
adopted a number of resolutions regarding UNFICYP before the cease-fire line was drawn up on 16 
August 1974 between the advanced positions of the Cypriot National Guard and the Turkish forces, 
stretching 180km from Kato Pyrgos on the northwest coast to Dherninia on the east coast (see 
Appendix 1). Lines drawn between the forward defended localities became respectively the National 
Guard and Turkish forces' ceasefire lines. An official UN buffer zone was established between the 
opposing sides along this line, ranging from 20 meters wide at its narrowest in Nicosia to 7 km wide 
near Atheniou. UNFICYP inspected the areas of confrontation and recorded the deployment of the 
military forces on both sides. Securing territorial status quo has become UNFICYP´s primary function 
by patrolling the buffer zone, but as we shall show later in this chapter, the military peacekeeping 
operation is “supplemented” by the Good Office mission of the Secretary General’s Representative. 
2.2 Defining Peacekeeping 
“As a general expression peacekeeping is third party role played by an actor in a 
violent conflict situation, operation involving military personnel, but without 
enforcement powers, undertaken by UN to help maintain or restore international 
peace and security in areas of conflict”.9 
“The prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or 
within states, through the medium of a peaceful third-party intervention organized 
and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and 
civilians to restore and maintain peace”.10 
Since the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, peacekeeping has been one of the most 
frequently used technique by and associated with the United Nations to terminate conflicts and 
establish peace. This form of intervention therefore mainly happens in the phases called “escalation”, 
                                                 
9 United Nations Blue Helmets 1996, p.6-8 
10 Dictionary of International Relations 1998, p.425-426 
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“endurance” by Rupesinghe (1996:26). Peacekeeping is not specifically mentioned in the UN Charter, 
but chapter 6 refers to the techniques the Security Council can adopt in pursuit of peaceful settlement 
of disputes, such as “arbitration, negotiation, mediation and fact-finding”11. Chapter 7 gives the 
Security Council “power to use armed forces if necessary”12, to maintain or restore peace and security. 
During the Cold War 13 peacekeeping operations were established, of which most had the aim of 
monitoring borders and buffer zones. When the Cold War was coming to an end, there were only five 
operations in the field: three in the Middle East, a small observer mission in Kashmir and UNFICYP in 
Cyprus. 
Contemporary peacekeeping can be appropriately characterized as multilateral, multidimensional 
and multicultural.13 Multilateralism firstly means, that the operation consists of the parties to the 
conflict and second, the operation includes actual deployment of peacekeepers such as the UN and 
other participants. Multiculturalism means that a peacekeeping force is assembled by a multiplicity of 
troops-contributing nations from all over the world. Multidimensional peacekeeping means that an 
operation has military, civilian police and civilian components. The military components – the land, 
naval, and air forces contributed by UN member states – can include both armed and unarmed soldiers, 
the later being used in e.g. observer missions. The military components are responsible for such tasks 
as “the monitoring and verification of cease-fires, demobilization of combatants, mine awareness 
education or mine clearance”.14 
The eldest peacekeeping operations had classical forms, when the form of peacekeeping was to 
facilitate conditions for a more comprehensive peace agreements. Today we called it - “first 
generation” peacekeeping operation. That is because of the work “An Agenda for Peace” made by the 
Secretary-General Boutros Ghali, which worked with the new dilemmas for the “second generation” 
peacekeeping operations. The end of the cold war brought eruption of conflicts based on the ethnicity, 
religion, culture and language. The second generation exactly means “the UN must be assist in a 
progression form conflict prevention, resolution and emergency assistance to reconstruction and 
rehabilitation, and then economic and social development.”15 
                                                 
11 Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operation 1999, p.5 
12 Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operation 1999, p.5 
13 Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operation 1999, p.15-17 
14 Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Operation 1999, p.15 
15 The Blue Helmets 1996, p.5 
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The civilian police component has become increasingly involved in the second generation 
peacekeeping operations playing a very important role in the last ten years. “International police 
monitors assist in the creation of secure environments and the maintenance of public order”16. “The 
civilian police forces train local law enforcement authorities on organizational, administrative and 
human rights issues”17.  
The civilian components can be divided into main groups: international organizations (IGOs) 
and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). IGOs include all UN agencies e.g., the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHRC), the UN Children Fund (UNICEF), as well regional 
organizations, e.g. Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
NGOs are organizations constituted separately from the government of the country, such as 
ICRC. The civilian component’s strength may be diplomatic, economic, ideological, scientific or 
humanitarian areas. 
2.3 The Mandate of UNFICYP 
As tensions rise in Cyprus, discussions were held in the Security Council between 18 February 
and 4 March 1964, and led to adoption on 4 March of a resolution setting up a United Nations 
peacekeeping force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for a period of three months and providing for the 
appointment of a mediator to seek a peaceful solution and settlement of the Cyprus problem. The 
council debates followed a request made by United Kingdom and The Republic of Cyprus. Cyprus in 
its request asked the Security Council to consider the increasing threat from the war preparations and 
declarations of the Turkish government about the invasion on Cyprus obvious and imminent. 
UNFICYP´s mandate in resolution 186, is given  
"…in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best 
efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the 
maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions." 18  
The Security Council has periodically extended that mandate, which was initially done every 
three months, on the recommendation of the Secretary General, who submitted a report about the status 
                                                 
16 Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Opeartion 1999, p.15 
17 Encyclopedia of International Peacekeeping Opeartion 1999, p.15 
18  Paragraph 5, the Security Council resolution 186 from 4 March 1964 
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of the situation and the mission in Cyprus. Nowadays its mandate has being prolonging prolonging 
each six-month, after the same procedure of Secretary-General. The Security Council has most recently 
extended the mandate of the Force until 15 June 2005 by its resolution 1568 adopted on 22 October 
2004.  
UNFICYP is composed following resolutions of the Security Council of three substantive 
components – political/ civil affairs, civilian police and military. The civilian affairs is engaged in 
aiding political as well as humanitarian, economic and bi-communal contacts. The civilian police 
contribute to the maintenance of law and order and the military contingents are deployed to ensure, to 
the extent, the maintenance of the military status quo along the cease-fire lines19.  
2.4 Financial Aspects 
UNFICYP was the only UN peacekeeping operation to have been funded voluntarily, when 
financial responsibilities were passed to contributing countries, although the United Nations were 
responsible for administrative and logistical costs for which the Secretary-General sought voluntary 
contributions. 
But the situation of the voluntary contribution had been untenable from the beginning of the 
1990s. In 1992, due to the frustration over the lack of progress towards a lasting political solution to the 
Cyprus problem, a number of troop-contributing governments decided to reconsider their participation 
in UNFICYP, deteriorating the financial situation of the force. In December 1992, the size of the force 
was significantly reduced by the withdrawal of the Danish battalion. In June 1993, the Canadian 
battalion was also withdrawn. 
The Secretary-General already introduced the worsening financial situations of UNFICYP to the 
Security Council from the end of the 1980´s. The Secretary-General stressed that UNFICYP would 
cease to be viable, because total strength would decrease in 1993 under the tolerable limit of 
approximately 850 personnel. The solution for this situation was to declare that UN would be 
responsible for everything, consequently involve financial sites, because the situation, when the 
Secretary-General looks for voluntary contribution, couldn’t continue. Following this, the Secretary-
General had to restructure and reorganize of the Force. In 1993 an offer came from the Argentinean 
                                                 
19 The Secretary General report on the UNFICYP in Cyprus, from 24.September 2004, p.3 
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government to sent Argentinean contingent to Cyprus, thus preventing the radical decrease in the total 
UNFICYP force. 
In June 1993, the Security Council made the decision to change the system of financing of the 
force. Nowadays, the budget for the maintenance of UNFICYP is each time currently under 
consideration of General Assembly and the mission is financed through the system of peacekeeping 
assessment, but still one third of budget of the Force comes from voluntary contributions.  
The General Assembly, in its resolution 28/301 of 18 June 2004, appropriated for UNFICYP an 
amount of 51,9 million dollars for the period from 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2005. The voluntary 
contribution of one third of the cost of the force, equivalent of 22,9 million, came from the Government 
of Greece and from the Government of Cyprus.  
2.5 Deployment  
The main UNFICYP’s headquarters is in the capital Nicosia. The Chief of the mission, nowadays 
Mr. Zbigniew Wlosowicz (Poland), who is Secretary-General Special Representative, heads 
UNFICYP. The Chief of the mission provides overall leadership to UNIFICYP and serves as the prime 
UN interlocutor on the island with both sides. 
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(See detailed map in Appendices) 
 
For operational purposes, the military component is divided into three sectors.  
Sector number one is on the western side, including Kokkina pocket and from Kato Pyrgos go 
just to the east of Mammari. The responsibility is of the leadership of the Argentinean contingent. The 
headquarters is in Skouriotissa and strength of the contingent is 403 men. 
Sector number two is in the central part of the Buffer Zone and including Nicosia, under the 
responsibility of the United Kingdom. The commandery is in Nicosia and number of soldiers is 412. 
Sector number four20 is on the eastern side of the island, from east coast near Dherinia, under the 
responsibility of the Slovakian and Hungarian contingents. The headquarters of the fourth sector is in 
Famagusta. The contingent has 396 soldiers. 
 
   
                                                 
20 There is no longer a Sector number three – this ceased to exist when Canada withdrew from UNFICYP in 1993. 
A Failed Attempt of Conflict Resolution: The Case of Cyprus 
 
 24
 
 
 
 
On the graph above you can find information about actual strength on Cyprus from the 
establishment from 4 March 1964 through each five years of the mission until today.    
The first deployment in Cyprus had strength 6238 personnel from 1964 (see detailed Annex 1). 
From 1973 our graph shows a total strength of only 2366 personnel: this is the year before deployment 
of the Turkish forces and establishment cease-fire between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. On 
15 July 1974 Turkish army occupied around 40% of Cyprus and total strength of UNFICYP 
components increased to 4444 personnel. This increase was caused by deployment of Turkish forces – 
around 70 000 personnel.  
 
In 1974 did the Greek Cypriot colonel Nikos Sampson and other officers with a 
support of the Greek military regime against president Makarios, a military coup. Idea 
was to connected Cyprus with Greece, when the first attend was in 1955 and the 
second just in 1973. The coup failed, but caused to protect the Turkish Cypriots 
minority and because existed the real apprehensions of annexation of Cyprus by 
Greece, the Turkish army intervened in the island. 
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In October 1977 the Finnish battalion withdrew from UNFICYP. Between the year 1984-1989, 
Sweden informed the Secretary-General that it had decided to withdraw its contingent. But still the 
deployment attained 2126 men in 1989. 
To stabilize the strength, the Force Commander adjusted the organization of UNFICYP by 
moving a greater portion of the battalions´ strength into the buffer zone and reorganizing the system of 
observation posts, relying more heavily on mobile patrolling.   
The current authorized strength of UNFICYP military components is 1224 (see detailed Annex 
2), deployed in the three sectors described earlier. The force maintains 12 camps, 17 permanent 
observation posts and 21 patrol bases. 
In connection with the Annan Plan, from 2004 we can see an increase of the military staff as well 
as police components. The total deployment could have been 2830 personnel, during 5 phases of the 
operation and could have upgraded the current UN military headquarters, deployed additional troops 
and established observer and civilian police teams throughout of island. The main task had to 
established the structure required for new operation within 90 days from inception of the Agreement. 
The main idea of “new” mission, if the referendum had been successful, was to demilitarise as well as 
unify the island.  
Nowadays, the situation in the deployment of the forces had changed after the referendums in 
April 2004, when the Greek sector refused the unification of the island.  The security situation in 
Cyprus is increasingly benign. The Secretary-General Kofi Annan recommended to the Security 
Council to cut the troop strength of UNFICYP by about one third. The reduction and restructuring of 
the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus will be in the military components down to 860, from the 
current 1224 personnel21. The total deployment will be around 930. The UN reconstruction works with 
new concept of operation – “concentration with mobility”22– is intended to maintain the same level of 
mandate implementation, with more efficient use of resources. The Force could also adjust its concept 
of observation and surveillance. As the post-referendum situation settled, the UN considered 
transforming the UNFICYP military components into a military observer group, stress more on mobile 
surveillance and patrolling of the Buffer zone with more flexibility. On the contrary, the civilian police 
deployment would be increased, while remaining within the current authorized strength and the UN 
                                                 
21 Report of the Secretary-General on the UNFICYP, 24.September 2004, paragraph 35-39 
22 Report of the Secretary-General on the UNFICYP, 24.September 2004, paragraph 36 
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wants to give more accent to support police, since it is considered more useful (for a second generation 
approach) than deployment of soldiers. 
2.5.1 Civilian Police Components 
The UNFICYP civilian police officers, who live among the local community, are the first point of 
contact for the civilian population within the Buffer zone. While the mandate strength of the 
UNIFICYP civilian police components is 69 personnel, the actual strength is 44 personnel (see Annex 
2), deployed in seven stations, including major offices in Pyla and Nicosia. 
 The UNFICYP civilian police perform a range of community and humanitarian task. 
These include contributing to the maintenance and restoration of law and order in the Buffer zone, 
monitoring investigations in the buffer zone by the Cyprus Police and the Turkish Cypriot Police. The 
UNFICYP play a major role in support of the civilian affair branch in humanitarian activities. Of 
course, the UNFICYP civilian police work together with military components to restore and maintain 
order in the three sectors. The UNFICYP civilian police participates in monitoring the crossing points 
in Ledra, Ayios Dometios/Metehan, Pergamos and Strovilia since they were open on 23 April 2003. 
The Civilian police assists to orderly movement of civilians and vehicles through the Buffer zone at 
these authorized crossing places. 
2.5.2 Other Units 
Other UNFICYP units consist of Civilian Affairs Branch, Mobile force, Public Information 
Office and UN Flight Force which run by UN international staff members and soldiers but consisting of 
140 personnel from military, civilian police and civilian streams. They provide securities and 
humanitarian support to the Buffer Zone residents. 
2.6 Activities in the buffer zone  
In accordance with its mandate, UNFICYP encourages the fullest possible resumption of normal 
civilian activity in the buffer zone, which is 180 kilometres long and covers around 3% of the islands 
surface area. Around 8.00023 civilians live and work in five inhabited villages, and certain other areas 
                                                 
23 The information is from 1993, when deployment of the Force was about 1200 personnel including 8.000 people live in the 
Buffer Zone  - http://www.unficyp.org/Facts+figures/facts+fig.htm 
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in the zone have been designated as civilian use areas, which means that they are freely accessible and 
are policed by local civilian police. The main civilian activity in the buffer zone is farming. Elsewhere 
in the buffer zone, no civilian movement or activity is permitted unless specifically authorized by 
UNFICYP. In Nicosia, in view of the security implications, such authorization is given only with the 
concurrence of both sides.  
UNFICYP provides its good offices24, as necessary, in regard to the supply of electricity and 
water across the lines, facilitates normal contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots by 
making available meeting facilities. The mission also provides for emergency medical services, 
including medical evacuations, and delivers mail and Red Cross messages across the ceasefire lines. 
2.7 The Good Office of the Secretary-General 
“The mission of Good Office” is the effort of the Secretary-General to make specific 
recommendations for overcoming any outstanding difficulty and to find way to solve the Cypriot 
conflict. The purpose of the good office mission is making interlink between office of the Secretary-
General and local politicians on both sides as well as the humanitarian works of the UN forces and 
contact with the inhabitants, especially in the Buffer zone. This is fully support by the Security 
Council, named in the most of its resolutions. The mission is going since year 1964, but still without 
real solution. The first real plan came nearly in 1992, because of the financial crisis and withdrawal of 
the Danish and Canadian contingents as mentioned before.  
From 1990 to 1992, efforts focused on securing an agreement on a draft overall agreement, 
known as the "Set of Ideas", which included a map setting out a proposed territorial adjustment. This 
document was endorsed by the Security Council in its resolution 774 (1992) as the basis for reaching 
an overall framework agreement. The “Set of ideas” from 1992 described an overall framework 
agreement, in particular on a territorial adjustment and displaced persons, being brought to a conclusion 
as an integrated package mutually agreed upon by both communities.25 The plan spoke about building a 
new partnership between the two communities and new constitution for Cyprus on a federal basis that 
means “bi-communal”26 society and “bi-zonal”13 territorial aspects.  Furthermore, the plan provided for 
                                                 
24 we shall explain more about “good offices” below 
25 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus,21 August 1992, p.1 
26 Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus,21 August 1992, p.9 
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the referendum, which should have taken place 30 days later, separately into the two communities. The 
referendums should have played the role of a confirmation of the overall framework agreement, about 
reunification of the island. Afterwards, Greek as well as Turkish leaders left the negotiations.   
We can see the components of the “Set of Ideas” of 1992 really close reflected in the Annan Plan. 
But the Annan Plan goes more in depth and describes more in details each step of reunion of the island. 
We will speak about it more in the chapter three. The Annan Plan had full support of the Security 
Council and was called “unique basis for comprehensive settlement”27. The proposed United Nations 
operation in the plan could have played a more substantial political role and could have worked 
actively to promote the implementation of a complex agreement. 
In the task of deployment the Annan Plan provides that operation could have monitored and 
verified the level of the Greek and the Turkish forces activities in the case of prevent and deter aim 
before escalation of security threats. The United Nations operations mandate on Cyprus could have 
continued so long as the federal government of the United Cyprus Republic does decide. 
2.8 Summary 
“Since the events of 1974, the situation in Cyprus has remained calm, although tension has arisen 
periodically. Both sides have generally respected the ceasefire and the military status quo. But, as the 
Secretary-General has repeatedly stated, the continuing quiet should not obscure the fact that there is 
only a ceasefire in Cyprus, not peace. The Security Council has declared on numerous occasions that 
the status quo is not an acceptable option. In the absence of progress towards a settlement between the 
two sides, the overall situation remains subject to sudden tensions, generated by events outside as well 
as within Cyprus” 28. 
The UN recognized the situation from 1964 as a threat for international peace and security and 
tried to protect the civilian population against hostile attacks. The deployment of the international 
forces and the mediator role of the UN took 40 years until now. In the beginning of a peacekeeping 
operation was deployed to establish and to maintain order and security. The so called “first generation” 
peacekeeping operations was deployed after Turkish army occupied about 40% of the island to secure 
the cease-fire between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot militant groups, as mentioned in this 
                                                 
27 called by the Security Council as well as the Secretary-General in many cases 
28 The Blue Helmets, review of the UN peacekeeping operation, p.167  
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chapter. We can see differences between this operation and what is happening now. Boutros Ghali gave 
in “An Agenda for Peace” from 1995 a new label to peace operation called “second generation” 
peacekeeping operations, which seeks to implement comprehensive solutions to viable peace, rather 
than merely preventing outbreaks of violence. “The mediation as a process involving the intervention 
of a third party who first investigates and defines the problem and then usually approaches each group 
separately with recommendations designed to provide a mutually acceptable solution.”29 
Nowadays, the management of the mission also deals with social issues, such as humanitarian 
functions, contribute to law, projects involving both communities. We can identify in the beginning of 
the 1990s a moment in which there has been a shift in the UN approach, resembling the one described 
by Boutros-Ghali. The United Nations have tried to reach a final agreement and used their skills and 
opportunities to find such a viable solution. We can also find motivations for the continued effort of the 
UN in the Annan Plan process from 2000. These can involve economical reasons, i.e. that the mission 
has cost more than 450 million dollars since 1993, and political reasons, i.e. Cyprus’ entrance to the 
EU.  
The differences came after a change of financial policy of the UN from the voluntary contribution 
to permanent assessed in 1992-93. A financial crisis nearly stopped the continuation of the mission, but 
the Security Council and international community focused to keep the mission. This situation led the 
Secretary-General and the Security Council to change finances of the forces. However, from the 
beginning of 1993 the mission has been mainly subsidized by contribution of the Republics of Greece 
and Cyprus30.  
Negotiations continued through the whole 1990s and led to the draft of the Annan Plan in 2004. 
The plan named after the Secretary-General Kofi Annan, and it is part of the result of his good office 
on Cyprus. The political interest of the UN is still to solve the problem and replace soldiers and use 
their own skills and opportunities in other more acute situations in other parts of the world. In the first 3 
decades of the mission of the mission the United Nations mainly played a passive role with regards to 
solving the situation, and the first generation approach failed to create a permanent settlement of the 
conflict.  
 
                                                 
29 Blake and Mouton : Solving Costly Organizational Conflicts, p.15 
30 These contributions amounted to nearly 50% of the mission’s budget in 2004. 
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After the redefinitions of the UN peacekeeping in Boutros Ghali’s work about the second 
generation of peacekeeping, the role of the UN became more active, trying to find common agreement 
to solve the dispute with support from both sides. In the following chapter, we shall analyze some 
aspects of the Annan Plan, which are significant from a political-geographical perspective.
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3 Constitutional power sharing and managing the land 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 2 we have described the role of the UN in Cyprus historically, focusing especially on 
the changes that took place during the latest decades in the UNFICYP. In chapter 3 we concentrate 
specifically on the latest attempt by the UN to solve the “Cyprus problem” (as it is named very often in 
the UN official documents), i.e. the so-called “Annan Plan” 31. The aim of the plan was to unify the 
island establishing a federal republic with two constituent states, the Greek Cypriot State and the 
Turkish Cypriot State. The plan had to be voted by the people in two “twin” referendum, which took 
place on the 24th April 2004. Before the voting day, there have been long periods of negotiations in 
which the national politicians as well as other actors were involved.  
It is necessary here to present the role that the situation in Cyprus plays internationally and to 
identify the principal political interests involved. This is also a key to understanding why some specific 
choices have been made especially by the UN and by the Cypriot politicians. The fact that the problem 
of Cyprus is important in international politics is shown by the overview of the geo-political position of 
the island. Telling generally about the borders in Cyprus and about its position, immediately it becomes 
clear that there are several levels in which you can approach the Cyprus role in the international 
relations. The island is divided internally by the ceasefire line that is nowadays not only a division 
between the Republic of Cyprus in the South and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the 
North, but also, after the 1st May, is also de facto an EU border32. From this point of view, the 
referendum was historically special for a project of unification of Cyprus, since it could have been 
combined with an entering of the whole island into the EU. Furthermore – even if we do not like this 
approach – it is also been told as a border between the Christian-Western world and the Islamic 
world33. These points have also strong connection with the possible future enlargement of the EU 
borders including Turkey. 
                                                 
31 We are aware that we have already mentioned some of the following information. We have chosen to name them again 
for a more complete explanation, and for a more logical development of the chapter. 
32 Hatay, 2004a 
33 We think it is necessary to observe that these definitions are quite traditional. We do not agree with the simplification of 
conflicts of interest between European and Middle Eastern or Arab states, but we use them since they are very commonly 
expressed. 
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Presenting briefly these statements, we want to stress the importance that that vote has had, and, 
consequently, the strong interests that were and are involved in the process of the conflict resolution 
ended up with the two referendums. The process of unification involves national politicians, but also 
EU administration, as they could have had a united Cyprus as a new member, or, as it happened, just 
the Southern sector (the Greek sector) of the island. This also results in a remarkable political problem, 
since the Northern Republic is not recognized by the UN other than Turkey, and so, formally, the 
whole island did become part of the EU. Beyond the EU, there are especially three countries that have 
been and are involved more than the others in the Cypriot situation. They are Greece, Turkey, as 
regional powers and main actors in the area and UK, since Cyprus was a British colony up to the 
Second World War. Finally, as the Middle East has been a crucial area in these decades, and 
considering what is happening just a few hundreds of kilometres far from Cyprus (in Israel and the 
areas around it), it becomes understandable and logic that also the US is being having strong interests 
in the area.  
Although all these countries have all had a role in the process of conflict resolution in the island 
in the last years, the primary international actor has been actually the Secretary General of the UN Kofi 
Annan, who led all the negotiation process. After the New York Agreement, Annan has become the 
“final arbiter”34, since he could “use his discretion”35 to fill in remaining blanks in the event of the 
parties themselves failing to complete the Foundation Agreement36. We will analyse the referendums of 
April 2004 more in depth in the next Chapter, it’s sufficient to name here just the results of those 
referendum. The majority of the Turkish Cypriots voted “Yes” (64.91%) but the Greek Cypriots voted 
“No” (75.83%) rejecting the plan. We are aware that an analysis of the Annan Plan is actually an 
analysis of what may have happened but did not. Or aim is to work on the plan in order to know more 
about what was really the proposal made by the UN, and especially some aspects of the plan, that 
maybe have been particularly relevant for the people’s choice.  
Section 3.2 thus deals with the ethnic power distribution between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. 
We wish to analyze the precise manner in which power was shared by the between them according to 
the Constitution of 1960. We also would like to present the political system defined by the Foundation 
                                                 
34 Hatay 2004a 
35 Hatay 2004a 
36 Foundation Agreement for the United Cyprus Republic is the title of the legal document which was to function as the 
constitution after 24th of April 2004, according to the Annan Plan.  
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Agreement, which could have given a second chance (after the constitution of 1960) to create a new 
state based of power- sharing. From this analysis we try also to find the differences between the legal 
framework of the Constitution of 1960 and the one proposed by the Annan Plan. 
In section 3.3 we work specifically with two aspects of the Foundation Agreement that are 
particularly delicate, analysing the territorial form of intervention the Annan Plan represents. These are 
the problem of the territorial division and the management of the property redistribution. These 
important topics, as they involve crucial aspects of the life of every Cypriot, have been relevant in the 
people’s vote, and they are surely also strongly linked with the part regarding the interests involved in 
the writing of the plan.   
 
THE ANNAN PLAN – AN OVERVIEW  
What did the plan propose 
The United Cyprus Republic proposed by the plan would have been a federation the 
Greek Cypriot Constituent State and Turkish Cypriot Constituent State, joined by a 
federal apparatus. The federal model is the Swiss one, with a collective presidential 
council, a president and vice-president, one for each community, chosen by the 
presidential council. The president and the vice president have to rotate in their 
function every 20 months. The plan provides for a bicameral legislature, made of the 
Senate (24 members for each community) and the Chamber of Deputies (48 members 
divided between the two communities in proportion of the population). Proposals for a 
national anthem, a flag, and the establishment of a Reconciliation Commission are also 
included in the plan.        
   The plan provides moreover that there is a limited right to return to the owned 
properties between the territories of the two federal states.  
   Greece and Turkey are allowed by the plan to maintain a permanent military present 
on Cyprus, and UK maintains two military base areas as UK sovereign areas on the 
island.  
The negotiations behind the draft of the plan 
Direct talks between heads of the Republic of Cyprus, i.e. of the Greek community, 
and of the TRNC, i.e. the Turkish community, started in January 2002, under the 
auspices of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. The first version of the Plan was 
released in November 2002, and it was revised in early December of the same year. 
After the EU Copenhagen Summit, there have been strong efforts to convince the parts 
to sign the Plan, but both refused. The UN Secretary-General continued the dialogues, 
and proposed a third version of the Plan in February 2003. In the same month, Tassos 
Papadopoulos was elected as President of the Republic of Cyprus.  
   In March 2003 there has been a collapse in the process, since Rauf Denktaş, the 
leader of the TRNC, refused to put the Annan Plan to referendum. 
   In February 2004, the negotiations were resumed and the talks between 
Papadopoulos, Denktaş and Annan, partly personally, partly through his Special 
Representative Alvaro de Soto, began on 19th February 2004. The formal negotiations 
ended on 31st March, as Kofi Annan presented the fifth and final version of the Annan 
Plan. 
 
References: UN Documents from www.annan.org 
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3.2 Power distribution between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, compared to 
1960 Constitution  
In this first part of chapter 3, we wish to analyse the precise manner in which power was shared 
by the two communities in relation to the constitution of 1960 based on power sharing. Through a 
political analysis of the constitution, we have tried to understand why this constitution failed  in 1963, 
(after 3 years of balance of power) and how the U.N with the Annan plan would answer to the 
problems of the constitution, trying to give in Cyprus a second opportunity based on power sharing. It 
is possible to state that Annan plan and the constitution of 1960 are consociational democracies, which 
is a concept developed by Arend Lijphart37 to define democratic system based on power sharing for 
multi-ethnic society. Lijphart uses the terms “multhi-ethnic society and divided society” with the same 
meaning and he writes that those societies are characterized by: 
Deep religious and class divisions separate distinct, isolated, and self- contained 
population groups. Social communication across class and religious boundary line 
is minimal38 
If you think to the situation in Cyprus and its characteristics, such as the religious differences, the 
physical separation and the limited contacts between the two communities, we can assert that the Greek 
and Turkish Cypriots are today a clear example of”divided society” (in relation to the Lijphart´s 
definition) on which we can apply constitutional theory based on power- sharing. 
In relation to Lijphart´s assertion, we have the impression that he does not consider the real 
difficulties that can arise if you consider a society as a divided society. He does not consider the cases 
in which one Greek and one Turkish person have or would like to have a family ties or some other 
human relationship, such as a marriage. He does not consider the difficulties that can arise in a 
multiethnic marriage in a divided society. 
Let us take a look on the political and social situation in Cyprus during 1960. The “Cyprus 
society” was characterized by the presence of two communities, the Greek one and the Turkish one, 
                                                 
37 Arend Lijphart is research professor emeritus of political science, university of California at San Diego. 
Lijphart´s research is focused on the comparative study of democratic institutions.he is the author or editor of more than a 
dozen books. Arend Lijphart has received numerous awards throughout his prestigious career in recognition of his 
groundbreaking research. 
38 Lijphart explained terms:” divided society” describing the Netherlands people in his book ”The politics of 
accomodation.Pluralism and democracy in the Netherlands”. This definition is quoted in Anna Jarstad:”Changing the game: 
consociational theory and ethnic quotas in Cyprus and New Zealand” 2001.pp.14-15. 
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two languages, two religious, the Muslim one and the orthodox one. But there was not any physical 
division, any boundary line between the two communities. In fact the Constitution of 1960 defined a 
non-territorial federation structure, in opposition to the territorial federation of the Annan plan. The 
constitution of 1960 defined a consociational model based on power sharing but within the same multi-
ethnic state. If you read the first article of the constitution of 1960, you will have soon the impression 
of “one state for two peoples”:  
an independent and sovereign republic with a presidential regime. The Greek 
president and the Turkish vice-president are elected respectively by the Greek and 
the Turkish communities of Cyprus according to the provisions of the 
constitution39. 
In terms of executive power, the Republic of Cyprus was a presidential system based on power 
sharing, with a high degree of political autonomy and based on division of powers: executive, 
legislative, judicial branches. As you can see there are two presidents for one state. The vice and 
president were elected simultaneously but separately by a majority of votes of their respective 
communities. Both of them had the executive power and the right of veto on some specific matters or 
on some specific decisions taken by the council of ministers and by the House of Representatives. 
The only most evident difference was that the Greek president could appoint more ministers than 
the Turkish one (7 vs. 3) but basically they had the same power40.  
If we compare the art 48 on ”executive power exercised by the president of the Republic” and the 
art 49 about the “executive power exercised by the vice president of the republic” we can see that the 
powers of the President and vice president were the same. Both had the 
Right of final veto on decisions of the Council of ministers concerning foreign 
affairs, defence or security (d), right of return of decisions of the Council of 
Ministers(e), right of return of laws of decisions of the house of representatives of 
the budget (g)...  
In relation to finance and foreign affairs, there was a Council of Ministers made up by seven 
Greek Cypriots and by three Turkish Cypriots. The decisions of Council were taken by absolute 
                                                 
39 Cyprus Constitution 1960: art.1 
40 Cyprus Constitution 1960: art. 46 
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majority and were inherent just to defence, finance and foreign affairs. The Constitution established 
that thirty-five of its members were Greek Cypriots and fifteen of the members were Turkish Cypriots. 
There were also two communal chambers composed by representatives elected from each own 
community. The articles 86 and 87 of the Constitution of 1960 show that the two communities could 
establish extensive powers of self-government. Religious matters, education, personal status, municipal 
institutions and affairs were reserved to the exclusive competence of Greek Cypriot and Turkish 
Cypriot chambers, each one elected by their respective communities. 
The communal chambers shall, in relation to their respective community, have a 
competence to exercise within the limits of this constitution legislative power 
solely with regard to the following matters religious all educational, personal 
status, the compositional and instances of courts dealing with civil disputes relating 
to personal status and to religious matters (..)41 
The judicial system included the supreme constitutional court, the high court of justice and 
communal courts. The supreme constitutional court was composed by 3 judges: one Greek Cypriot, one 
Turkish Cypriot and a neutral judge and had ”exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate a recourse, an act, an 
admission of any organ”42. The high court of justice was composed of two Greek judges, one Turkish 
judge and a neutral judge43. If the defendant or accused person was linked to both the communities then 
the judges had to be linked to both the communities44. 
Civil disputes relating to personal status or religious matters were reserved to the communal 
courts. These courts could not impose detention, imprisonment or restraint. So the powers of the Courts 
concerning personal status and religious were limited45.  
In our opinion, the constitution of 1960 protected, politically speaking the Turkish minority. In 
fact the Turkish people were only the 18% on the total of the population but thanks to the 
consociational non- territorial model they had the possibility to have a role on the political legislative 
and judicial life of the Country. Critics opposing the degree of power sharing could argue that the 
ethnic quota system of the constitution gave too much power to the Turkish minority. Although the 
                                                 
41 Cyprus Constitution 1960:art 87 
42 Cyprus Constitution 1960: art 146 
43 Cyprus Constitution 1960: art 153 
44 Cyprus Constitution 1960: art 159 
45 Cyprus Constitution 1960: art 160 
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Turkish people represented only the 18% of the population in the decision process, they had the power 
of the 30% 
 Lijphart had identified some characteristic presented in a consociational democracy for a 
multiethnic society in order to guarantee the representation of the minorities; we can state that those 
characteristics were present in the consociational model of 1960. And they are: 
• Proportionality of power: to protect the minorities. In Cyprus, it was the mentioned 
70% v 30%. 
• Mutual veto: “minorities and majorities can use the veto to advance goals that aren’t 
always compatible with the objectives of the state as a collectivity”46. This is in 
accordance with art 50, the President and Vice president, had the right of veto on any 
law or decision of the House of Representatives. 
• Grand coalition and segmented authority that he defined in the following way: “Grand 
coalitions and segmented autonomy: shared decision making by representatives of all 
significant segments with regard to matters of common concern and autonomous 
decision-making by and for each separate segment on all other issues”. According to 
art 87, the two Cypriot communities had autonomy on matters concerning the 
religious, the education, the personal status, the municipal institutions and according 
to art 47, the two communities, had to cooperate for some specific communal matters, 
under a common umbrella. 
The political equilibrium intended by the Constitution of 1960 ended in 1963 when Greek 
Cypriot president proposed 13 amendments to the Cypriot constitution that eliminated the balance of 
power, the rights and the protection of the Turkish minority. 
He acted unilaterally the 13 points without the Turkish approval and calling the amendments, in a 
presidential memorandum: “suggested measures for facilitating the smooth functioning of the state and 
for the removal of certain causes of intercommunal friction”. 
                                                 
46.  These features were written by Lijphart in:” democracy in plural societies”. We have taken the information by 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/kokkalis/GSW2/Savvides.PDF ( Cyprus: the dynamics of partition) and the definition of grand 
coalition and segmented autonomy by “Changing the game”Anna jarstad . 2001. Pp.23. 
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The amendments destroyed the power sharing and were accused of oppressing the minority. Let 
us see what happened: “the administration of justice to be unified” (n.7)47. Greeks and Turkish were 
judged by mixed courts but in this way, in our point of view, the justice were not assured any more. In 
a trial between a Greek person and a Turkish one who will check that the Greek and Turkish judges 
will judge with impartiality? 
The amendment number one, stated that “The veto powers of the president and vice president 
were to be abolished”.48 The President and the vice president would not have any more the right of 
final veto concerning laws or decision of the House of Representatives. The point number 10 
established that: 
 
The proportion of the participation of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the 
composition of the republic service and forces of the republic to be modified in 
proportion to the ratio of the population of Greek and Turkish Cypriots.49 
The constitution provided that the security forces had to be composed of 70% Greek Cypriots and 
30%Turkish Cypriot and that the army shall be composed by of 60%Greek Cypriot and 40% Turkish 
Cypriot. This amendment reduced the participation of Turkish Cypriots in public service and forces and 
“reduced the participation power (power to make appointments) to 18.86% while that one of the Greeks 
grown to an 81.4%. 
The point n.13 stated that ”both communal chamber are abolished” 
The two communal chambers gave to Greek and Turkish communities the power of self-
government with two independent and separated for matters concerning the religion, personal status, 
educational. Once this system was abolished, who would have protected the Turkish minority? Why 
did the Constitution of Cyprus based on power sharing failed? 
There are several explanations for the failure of the Constitution of 1960; most of the experts 
pointed out that this failure is due to the absence of territorial federation autonomy. The Constitution of 
1960 did not set up a boundary line for the two communities. It just created a heterogeneous state for 
two people (in opposition to the ethnically homogeneous states in the Annan plan). 
                                                 
47 htt:.//www.cyprus-conflict.net/13_points.htm (the 13 points: November 1963). 
48 htt:.//www.cyprus-conflict.net/13_points.htm  (the 13 points: November 1963) 
49 htt:.//www.cyprus-conflict.net/13_points.htm (the 13 points: November 1963). 
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Greek and Turkish peoples were intermixed over a common territory and the minority was 
dominated by the cultural majority of the group. The Greek Cypriot regarded “themselves primarily as 
Greek rather than Cypriot”.50 The same was for the Turkish people. The population did not identified 
themselves as Cyprus people even if the Constitution identified just one state. 
In our opinion even if the Constitution of 1960 gave in Cyprus three years of relative stability or 
balance, it did not provided an autonomy identity for the two communities as “Cypriots”. According to 
Guy Dundas51 
Within a territorial federation, such geographical minorities would most likely 
come under the jurisdiction dominated by the culture majority group, in areas of 
competence that are culturally sensitive and therefore divisive52 
Yildizian and Ehteshami pointed out that the two communities had some religious, social and 
cultural differences.53 They had separate schools, there were orthodox and Muslim priest, and the 
religious institutions controlled the schools. There were also, traditional differences between Greek and 
Turkish education. 
The Greek Cypriots educated their children for trade and profession. On the other 
hand, the Turkish-Cypriots gave priority on algebra, natural science and Turkish 
language.54 
Guy Dundas sustained that the 13 amendments burned for the need of an identity for both the 
community and that:” the rapid breakdown of the 1960 regime might suggest that non-territorial 
                                                 
50This is sustained by Yildizian and Ehteshami (professors of international relations; university of Duram). 
www.wickedness.net/els/els1/ararx%20paper.pdf.  (Ethnic conflict in Cyprus and the contact hypotesis: an empirical 
investigation ). 
 
51 Professor of the University of Adelaide, author of political books and articles. http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2004.00322.x/abs/ (Cyprus from 1960 to E:U accession: the case for non- 
territorial autonomy) 
 
8http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2004.00322.x/abs/ (Cyprus from 1960 to E:U accession: 
the case for non- territorial autonomy) 
53 yldizian and ehteshami are professors of international relations; university of Duram. The informations were taken by 
www.wickedness.net/els/els1/ararx%20paper.pdf (Ethnic conflict in Cyprus and the contact hypotesis:an empirical 
investigation ). 
 
54 Just written in the previous  reference (n. 9) 
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autonomy was inappropriate for Cyprus as a political institution, or at very least insufficient to prevent 
cultural conflict”.55 
On the contrary, Lijphart, considered the failure of the non territorial consociational model due to 
external specific reason, not to the failure of model in itself: 
The main reason of the failure of the consociationalism model in Cyprus is that it 
cannot be imposed against the wishes of one or more segments in a plural society 
and, in particular against the residence of a majority segment (..)56 
Actually the Constitution of 1960 was based on two agreements ”the London and the Zurich 
agreements“ that determined the basic articles of the constitution. Those agreements were signed by the 
foreign ministers of Great Britain, Greece, and Turkey as well as the Greek Cypriot archbishop and Dr. 
Kuchuk on behalf of the Turkish community. At the same time, three treaties were signed by the same 
parties; “the treaty of establishment, the treaty of alliance and the treaty of guarantee”.57 
Interpreting the above statement of Lijphart, we could assert that the British rules had influenced 
the frame of Constitution. So the Constitution was not affected by the will of the Cyprus people and 
this generated the failure of the Constitution. The art. 181 (of the constitution), declared that the treaties 
of guarantee and alliance: ”shall have constitution force”; the art 182 (of the constitution), reported one 
of the most important cardinals principles  
the articles or parts of articles of this constitution which have been incorporated 
from the Zurich agreement, are the basic articles of this constitution and cannot, in 
any way, be amended, whether by way of variation, addition or repeal. 
The right of the people to determine their own political status and therefore their economic, social 
and cultural developments without any foreign interference is recognized as a fundamental right by the 
United Nations. 
                                                 
55 Professor of the University of Adelaide, author of political books and articles. http://www.blackwell-
synergy.com/links/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8497.2004.00322.x/abs/ (Cyprus from 1960 to E:U accession: the case for non- 
territorial autonomy) 
 
56 Jarstad 2001:79. 
57 http://kypros.org/Documents/Tornaritis/docs/question.html ( the Zurich and London agreements, the constitution and the 
treaties) 
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All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development.58 
On the basis of the above statements, if you read the constitution of 1960 you will have the 
impression that constitution of 1960 did not respect the democratic principles by the United Nations. 
The art 181 did not allow to the two communities the right to change the constitution, so right of self-
determination. 
3.2.1 The Annan plan: the second attempt to have a consociational model based on power 
sharing. 
As just written before, The Annan provides a territorial federation in opposition to the non-
territorial federation structure of the constitution of 1960, which is formulated in the Foundation 
Agreement. The second article of the Foundation Agreement (part a) lets us understand this important 
dissimilarity. 
the united Cyprus republic is an independent state in the form of an indissoluble 
partnership, with a federal government and two equal constituent states, the Greek 
Cypriot states, and the Turkish Cypriot state. Cyprus is a member of the United 
Nations and has a single international legal personality and sovereignty. 
The united Cyprus republic is organized under its constitution in accordance with 
the basic of rule of law, democracy, representative republican government, political 
equality, by-zonality, and the equal status of the constituent states.59  
The first objective of the Annan plan was to create two different states (communities) that would 
have had the right of self-government trough their respective administrations within their own separate 
zones. These two states (communities) would have cooperated only under a central government (the 
federal apparatus).   
The Presidential Council would have the executive power and the members of this would have 
been elected from the majority of the Senate with the approval of the majority of the Chamber of 
Deputies and of the Council. 
 There would have been a President and a Vice-president for each community, (elected 
respectively from their own communities). Both would have exercised the executive power. 
                                                 
58 www.hrew.org/legal/cpr.html (the united nation;international covenant on civil and political rights ) 
59 Foundation Agreement: Main Articles, 1:1- 4 
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The Federal Government would have exercised the legislative and executive power only for some 
specific matters as established by the art. 14 such as, for example, external relations (including 
conclusion of international treaties), defense policy, relations with European Union; Central bank 
functions, Cypriot citizenship and immigration, federal finances, including budget and all indirect 
taxation and federal economic and trade policy. For other particular issues, the two communities would 
have political autonomy.  
In relation to the legislative power, the federal parliament would have been composed of two 
chambers: senate and the chambers of deputies. 
“Each chamber shall have 48 members. The senate shall be composed of an equal number of 
Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots”.60 
The decisions of parliament would be accepted with the approval of both Chambers (with simple 
majority of members)61. 
After this political analysis we can state that the Annan plan would have made more physically 
and politically independent the two communities (compared to the Constitution of 1960). Moreover 
particular articles would have given protection, identity and autonomy to the citizenship. 
In relation to the lack of identity in the constitution of 1960, the Foundation Agreement seems to 
answer, with the art 3.1 and the art 3.6.362, to the need of identity for the two communities. In fact in 
the Annan plan there is this following expression: ”there is a single Cypriot citizenship.Special 
majority federal law shall regulate eligibility for Cypriot citizenship“63. Furthermore, “to preserve its 
identity, Cyprus may adopt specified non- discriminatory safeguard measures in respect of the Turkish 
and Greeks communities “64.  
Also the Reconciliation commission would have helped the Cypriots citizens, with the specific 
objective of “promoting understanding, tolerance and mutual respect between Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots” (annex XVIII). 
This commission would have made up by seven members for each constituent state. The 
objective will be: 
                                                 
60 Foundation Agreement: Main Articles, art 5.1 
61 Foundation Agreement: Art. 25.1 
62 Foundation Agreement: Main Articles  
63 Foundation Agreement: Main Articles, art 3.1 
64 Foundation Agreement: Main Articles, art 3.6 
A Failed Attempt of Conflict Resolution: The Case of Cyprus 
 
 43
• “Promote a dispassionate dialogue between Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots regarding the past, by addressing, historical perspectives, 
experiences, and memories. 
• Prepare a comprehensive report on the history of the Cyprus problem as 
experienced and interpreted by Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. 
• Make specific recommendations for action by the federal government 
and the constituent states aimed at promoting reconciliation 
• Make recommendations for the implementation of the requirement in the 
constitution for the teaching of the official languages to all secondary 
school students 
• Make recommendations on guidelines for the observance of secular 
public by the constituent state.”65  
In order to reach all the goals above indicated, the Reconciliation Commission will have “the 
powers to receive information’s from varied sources, from parties, governments or individuals inside or 
outside Cyprus, administer and determine the final status and management arrangements for 
monuments and material sites connected to the events or between 1962 and 1974, that are located in 
areas subject to territorial adjustment”.66  
In our opinion, the Reconciliation Commission would have been a good chance to create a 
national history and we think that, the concept of communal memories is not against the nationalism 
concept; it is not an instrument to homogenise the two ethnic groups. The history of one nation could 
be made by two peoples but according to several points of view it is always one. The national history 
by the reconciliation commission could be a good instrument to comprehend a national identity 
formation. 
After this political analysis of the Annan plan, we can state that, in our point of view, the Annan 
plan would have answered to the need of identity and autonomy but maybe the Turkish Cypriots would 
still have too much power than Greek Cypriot leaders would accept. 
                                                 
65 Foundation Agreement: Annex VIII, art 2 
66 Foundation Agreement: Annex VIII, art 3 
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According to the Main article 2, point to the territorial division, the two groups would have had 
the possibility to recognize themselves in a separate territory in which to show their religion, language, 
culture, without the interferences of the other community.  
According to the Main article 3, the two groups would have had a Cypriots identity before 
Turkish or Greek identity and a new organ, the mentioned reconciliation commission to promote the 
tolerance and the mutual respect 
With this federal government, the two communities would have had a relevant autonomy; they 
would have cooperated (under the federal government) only for communal matters.  
Although the Turkish minority, represented only the 18% of the total population, the rights of 
self- determination would have been the same for both the communities and the power would have 
been equal also in the senate (“the senate shall be composed of an equal number of Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots”67). 
3.3 Territorial division and property issue 
From a political-geographical perspective, two aspects of the Annan Plan are particularly relevant 
for our analysis. These are the territorial division of the island and the problem of the redistribution of 
the immobile properties, such as land and houses. We will start with the border issue, and then we will 
focus on the property issue, bearing in mind that the two subjects are strongly connected, since the 
topic of the border adjustment represents itself an aspect that is crucial for the management of the 
property redistribution the Foundation Agreement provides for. 
We will start with a brief explanation of the situation concerning the borders, then we will focus 
on the reasons of the choice (in the Annan Plan) to move the borders as well as the choice of how to 
draw the new borders. After the hostilities that took place from 1963 to 1974 and the intervention68 by 
the Turkish army in the island, Cyprus is now de facto divided into two autonomous parts: the Southern 
sector controlled by the internationally recognized Cypriot government and the Northern sector 
controlled by the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus69, as we have already mentioned in chapter 2. 
                                                 
67 Foundation Agreement: Main Articles, art 5 
68 “Occupation”, according to the Greek Cypriots-oriented sources, “intervention of defence” in the Turkish Cypriot-oriented 
sources. 
69 TRNC in the following 
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The Annan Plan changes70 the borders that are now dividing the two communities, as described in 
Chapter 2, moving some of the territory from the TC sector to the GC sector. The relative size of the 
two sectors (“constituent states” in the text of the Plan, as they should have become if the referendum 
had been successful) changes in favour to the Greek constituent state, that gains about 3% more of the 
total surface of the island. The greatest enlargement is in Morphou and the area around the town, at the 
Western part of the border; significant changes are provided by the Plan also in the Eastern part of the 
border, the area in which the border has been changed into a more irregular and longer one (we will 
come back to this topic below). The Plan tells about the territorial adjustment in Article 9 of the “Main 
Articles” of the Foundation Agreement, and then we find a detailed explanation of the changes in the 
borders and some maps in the Attachment 171.  
   The reasons why the Annan Plan provides for a change in the border72 are complex and quite 
difficult to find, so we can basically present some possibilities. On the one hand, using an approach of 
social geography, we can say that the sector that is controlled by the TRNC has a density of population 
that is much lower than the one that we find in the South of the island, since the 18% of the total 
population identifying themselves as Turkish Cypriot control almost the 40% of the island. This could 
be partly an explanation of the reason why the UN73 have chosen to move the border in favour of the 
Southern constituent state.  
   On the other hand, from a political point of view, there has possibly also been the attempts by 
the UN not to show a complete acceptance of the situation established by the trouble of the 1960s and 
early 1970s, manly because the Turkish intervention has been always seen by a large majority of Greek 
Cypriots as an unjustified occupation74. 
                                                 
70 We should write “would have been changed”, but for practical reason we will speak about the Annan Plan a fact, using the 
Present 
71 See the following pages to see the main map of the border adjustment in the Annan Plan 
72 It could have been decided to keep the buffer zone as a border between the two constituent states, giving in that case the 
zone itself to one of the two constituent states 
73 We will underline often that the process the brought about the Foundation Agreement of the Annan Plan did not have a 
strong participation by the Cypriot politicians. 
74 We did not find a single source coming from the Greek part of the island, that speaks about the hostilities of the last 
decades without using the word “occupation” 
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   From an economical-geographical perspective75, it is also relevant to look at the characteristics 
of the land that the Plan would transfer to the Greek Cypriot constituent state taking it partly from the 
UN buffer zone and partly from the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. In order to understand that, since 
the area is mainly used for agricultural purposes, it is useful to look at a map of the use of the land in 
Cyprus (see map 1)76 and match our observation the map of the Foundation Agreement (see map 2)77. 
                                                 
75 We do know that the issue of the land that you own can also bring about strong consequences from a cultural point of 
view, since, also historically, the land has played a crucial role also for the sense of “identity” of a group. We will nor work on 
this aspect here, focusing on the possible economic consequences of the territorial edjustment. 
76 ReiseNett AS 2004 (website). The map is provided by the US CIA.  
77 Attachment 2A, The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus problem, 31st March 2004, page 88, www.annanplan.org 
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Map 1 
Map 2 
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   The analysis of the two maps together shows that the area that would have passed under the 
control of the Greek Cypriot constituent state is generally productive land. It is mainly characterised by 
irrigated farming, and a major part of it is used for the production of citrus and other fruits (highly 
profitable), both in the area of Morphou and at the Eastern part of the border, West of Farmagusta.  
   A smaller part is characterised by arable land and by the cultivation of cereals. We can thus 
conclude that the areas involved in the border management are basically productive areas. The change 
of the border would have also brought about a decrease in the agricultural production of the Turkish 
Cypriot area, with a correspondent increase in the agricultural production of the Greek constituent 
state78. This element is significant, bearing in mind that agriculture is still having a significant 
economic importance in the TRNC. In 2003, although the primary sector represents the 10.6% of the 
GDP of the Area in 200379, it accounts for 41.6% of the total domestic exports of the TRNC80, and 
constitutes the 15.7% of the working population employment81. Moreover, this fact is even more 
relevant, if we consider that the GDP per capita of the TRNC, estimated in 5600$ in 2003, is 65% less 
than the GDP per capita of the Greek Cypriot Republic, estimates in 16000$ in 200382.  
   The direct economic loss for the TRNC, as percentage of GDP, can be rudely estimated. The 
area of the TRNC that is involved in the territorial adjustment represent the 2.92%83 (not considering 
the buffer zone, that is not used by the Turkish Cypriot even now). Since it is in average more 
productive than the rest of the TRNC, we can estimate the loss of agricultural production84 to 6-8%. 
Since the agricultural sector represents 10.6% of the GDP, the estimated direct loss of the GDP is not 
much higher than 1%85. We are also aware that an agricultural loss can result also in an indirect 
disadvantage for other economic sectors, so that the percentage can increase. Moreover, we should bear 
in mind that the involved territories are mainly agricultural, but not just agricultural, and they also 
involve a short part of coast, creating in this way also an effect in the tourist resources, so important for 
the Cypriot economy. 
                                                 
78 It can be argued, following the so-called “realistic school”, that the fact that the land is not simply lost, but given to the 
counterpart, makes the difference even ore relevant. 
79 CIA: The World Factbook, updated 11th May 2004, from www.cia.gov 
80 From: State Planning Organization of TRNC, www.devplan.org (data of 2003) 
81 From: State Planning Organization of TRNC, www.devplan.org (data of 2002) 
82 Both data are from: CIA: The World Factbook, updated 11th May 2004, from www.cia.gov 
83 From: State Planning Organization of TRNC, www.devplan.org 
84 And, consequently, in the economic value that agriculture produce 
85 Considering the indirect effects, and also the effects on the other sectors, the loss would be higher, even if it is very 
difficult to estimate it precisely 
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   The conclusion that Eichengreen et al.86 reach is that the changes in the border would have had 
significant consequences for the economic performance of the two areas, with a huge loss of productive 
land by the Northern sector of the island87. They argue that the adjustment of the border results in such 
a great economic loss that it would be preferable to vote “No” in the referendum. The empirical data 
they bring88 drive them to the conclusion of an economic loss for the Turkish sector of 22% of the 
GDP89. Their conclusion is clear: economically, the Annan Plan is absolutely not convenient for the 
Turkish part. 
   Our opinion90 is that the considerations mentioned above are just a part of the topic, and that the 
unification could have brought also great advantages for the Northern sector of the island, and not just 
losses. The report of Eichengreen et al. forgets that the entrance in the EU can bring some advantages 
for the Turkish constituent state. We do not state that their considerations are wrong but an analysis 
must include also the possible advantages of accepting the Plan, and not merely the losses of the 
acceptance of it. 
Focusing now on the characteristics of the new border provided by the Annan Plan, one element 
is quite evident91, i.e. the fact that the new border is much more irregular that the actual one. The way 
in which the border is drawn92 implies that especially towards the East, the contact between the people 
living in the two constituent states may be facilitated. If we observe the actual UN buffer zone we can 
immediately note that the border is much shorter than the border proposed by the Plan. This represents 
also a difference and a new element introduced by the UN, if we present a brief comparison between 
the border provided by the Annan Plan, and the border that was proposed by the UN during the 
negotiations between the GC and TC politicians back in 1992 (see map 3)93. 
                                                 
86 Barry Eichengreen, Riccardo Faini, Jürgen von Hagen, Charles Wyplosz, Economic Aspects of the Annan Plan for the 
Solution of the Cyprus problem, 2004 
87 TRNC, or Turkish Cypriot constituent state, according to the vocabulary of the Plan 
88 Not supported by any reference, so we will not mention them. Those data differ significantly from the ones presented by 
us before. We consider the result they presented as a bit too high. Is it rational to think that less than 3% of the territory 
could have result in a loss of 22% of the GDP? Theit estimates are, concerning to us, a bit too pessimistic. 
89 And, consequently, the same decrease in the GDP per capita, since the number of inhabitants is not expected to change. 
90 And probably also the one of the majority of the Turkish Cypriots, since they did not follow the suggestions of the group of 
researchers mentioned above (Eichengreen and others) 
91 The comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (5th version, 31/03/2004), page 88-90 (maps) 
92 See map of the new border, The Comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus problem, 31st March 2004, downloaded from 
www.annanplan.org  
93 Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, 21st August 1992, page 25 
 
A Failed Attempt of Conflict Resolution: The Case of Cyprus 
 
 50
  
 
 
Map 3: from Security Council: Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus, 21st August 1992, page 25 
 
   The border that the UN drew at that time was basically the same94 as the one of the Annan Plan 
of 2004, except that at the Eastern part we do not see (in the map of 1992) the irregularity in the border 
that we see proposed by the Annan Plan. A border like the one proposed by the Annan Plan would have 
probably favoured a major rate of contacts between the two groups, since in that area the two 
constituent states would have been really mixed. There could have been different reasons for this 
choice. On the one hand, we could hypothesize that the choice has been made in order to favour a 
major development of contacts between the two constituent states. On the other hand, the choice could 
have been determined by the willing to keep certain villages in the Greek constituent state, in an area 
which would otherwise remain more coherently under the control of the Turkish Cypriot constituent 
state. 
   Another reason why the border has been proposed to move is also the management of the 
properties in the unified Cyprus, which is the subject of the next part of our report. This is an extremely 
                                                 
94 Showing that a solution based on one federal state with two constituent states, and two referendums to legitimise the 
process, is not a new idea by the UN, and that the Plan keeps big parts of the solutions proposed in the early 1990s 
1992 UN proposal for a border 
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complex subject, since the hostilities of 1963-1974 led to an enormous number of refugees, from both 
sides. It might be relevant also to look at some number concerning this aspect, in order to better 
understand the huge95 size of the problem we are writing about.  
   In 1962-64, after the crisis of 1962, after which Cyprus had become a “segregated society and a 
separate country”96, between 20000 and 25000 Turkish Cypriots became refugees97. Afterwards, with 
the Turkish invasion of July 1974, 158,000 Greek Cypriots were “escaped as quickly as possible”98. 
Then, in the following years, other Greek Cypriots99 moved to the Southern sector of the island. As a 
result, in 1995 less than 500 Greek Cypriots were still living in the Northern sector100. The Council of 
Europe in 1992 has estimated that 180,000 Greek Cypriots “were expelled”101 from the Northern 
sector. 
   In the last decades, a majority of the refugees102 have lived in houses that were owned by 
people that moved away, and the Foundation Agreement establishes a large set of regulations for the 
management of this issue. The rules differ for the management of the area that would have passed to 
the Greek Cypriot Constituent State and for the other areas. The brief explanation of the management 
of the properties is explained in the Article 10 of the Main Articles, and is then elaborated in Annex VII 
of the Foundation Agreement. Moreover, a fact sheet has been published by the UN103, for a more 
simple explanation. Instead of explaining all the rules that are proposed by the Plan, we shall underline 
some aspects, in order to discuss how the property distribution may lead to an enhancement of ethic 
division along territorial lines or the opposite. The plan provides for the creation of an “independent, 
                                                 
95 “Huge” considering the total population of the island, that counts 775927 inhabitants, in the estimates reported in CIA 
Factbook, July 2004 
96 N. Kliot and Y. Mansfield, The political landscape of partition – The case of Cyprus, in Political Geography, Vol. 16, no. 6, 
Great Britain 1997, pag.499 
97 N. Kliot and Y. Mansfield, The political landscape of partition – The case of Cyprus, in Political Geography, Vol. 16, no. 6, 
Great Britain 1997, pag.501 
98 N. Kliot and Y. Mansfield, The political landscape of partition – The case of Cyprus, in Political Geography, Vol. 16, no. 6, 
Great Britain 1997, pag.503 
99 Actually, just in some cases it has been a free choice, more often a forced choice, since in the TRNC a strong process of 
“Turkification” (Kliot and Mansfield, 1997, page 506) has happened 
100 N. Kliot and Y. Mansfield, The political landscape of partition – The case of Cyprus, in Political Geography, Vol. 16, no. 6, 
Great Britain 1997, pag.506 
101 N. Kliot and Y. Mansfield, The political landscape of partition – The case of Cyprus, in Political Geography, Vol. 16, no. 6, 
Great Britain 1997, pag.506 
102 From both sides, but mainly TC refugees 
103 All the UN documents regarding the Plan are taken from the net: www.annanplan.org  
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impartial” Property Board, which should be governed by an “equal number of members from each 
constituent state, as well as non-Cypriot members” 104.  
The management rules of the properties differ concerning the belonging or not to the areas 
subject to territorial adjustment105.  
Regarding the management of the properties located in areas subject to the territorial adjustment, 
the basic rule is that “(..) any dispossessed owner of a property in area subject to territorial adjustment 
shall be entitled to reinstatement”106. The current users have to leave the affected properties, and If they 
cannot afford to purchase other properties in the same area, they must claim reinstatement of their own 
affected property. If they do not own an affected property in the area107, they have to “be relocated in 
the other constituent state”108. If they cannot afford to buy a property there, they will receive 
“alternative accommodation”109 in the other constituent state. 
   The general rule for the areas that are not subjected to the territorial adjustment, is the “1/3rd 
Rule”, following which “everybody who lost properties in the other constituent state can get back up to 
1/3rd of their property and be paid compensation for the rest […]”, with some variations and exceptions, 
as for example the entitlement for the whole property in case of “small landowner”,110. The remaining 
two thirds will be given in bonds maturing in 25 years. The “Choice Rule” provides that the 
redistribution of the properties is not centrally decided by the Property Board, but that “it’s your [the 
dispossessed owners’] choice and the system is flexible”111. The aspect of flexibility is underlined also 
by Lefteris Adelinis112 in an interview by Didier Pfirter saying that the final version of the Plan’s 
property management is “easier and more functional”113.  
 
                                                 
104 Foundation Agreement: Main Articles: 10. 
105 Foundation Agreement: Main Articles: 10, paragraphs 2 & 3 
106 Foundation Agreement: Annex VII: att.4, art. 2. 
107 Extremely common, since the property in the territories subjected to the territorial adjustment are mainly owned by Greek 
Cypriots 
108 Foundation Agreement: Annex VII: att.4, art. 5c. Except if entitled under the provisions described in Attachment 3, that 
we consider relatively rare. 
109 The term is defined in Paragraph 2 of Article 1 in Attachment 1: Definitions, from www.annanplan.org  
110 UN Fact Sheet on your property rights under the Plan, downloaded from www.annanplan.org  
111 UN Fact Sheet on your property rights under the Plan, downloaded from www.annanplan.org 
112 Interview by Mr. Didier Pfirter to Lefteris Adelinis, Legal Adviser, Secretary-General's mission of good offices, to Politis, 4 
April 2004, downloaded from www.annanplan.org, pag.1 
113 That we will not analyse in details, because it would be a too specifically legal discussion. Neither will we discuss the 
exceptions to the “Choice Rule”. 
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   A great number of critiques have arisen, about the property management that the Plan provides 
for. We will especially present some arguments that a group of researchers discussed in a report 
addressed to the “Government of the Republic of Cyprus”114. They argue that “the implementation [of 
the treatment of the dispossessed owners] proposed in the Annan Plan is not efficient or equitable”115. 
In the article just quoted, there is a strong critic concerning especially the problem of the values of the 
properties. The Foundation Agreement states just that they should be considered with their “current 
value”, defined as the value of the property at the time of dispossession plus an adjustment reflecting 
the appreciation since then116. Eichengreen et al. argue that this method implies the assumption that 
“property prices would have developed in the way they did since 1974, even if the political events 
leading to the separation of the country had not occurred”117. Consequently, concerning to them, the 
prises used by the Property Board could not reflect the value that a market reach in the long run. They 
write that the value of the properties in the Northern sector of the island would likely be higher without 
the division of the island.  
However, it is very difficult to define a market value when, as in the North of the island, a 
functioning property market does not exist. Eichengreen et al. express the critique that the basic 
mistake of the Plan is that it tries to “substitute rules to acual market values” and it could, in this way, 
“create inequities and, therefore, recriminations”118. With these expressions, they wanted to warn that 
there could be unbalanced and unfair situations, and consequently people complaining about that. The 
“inequities” should have been between owners, caused by unbalanced treatments caused by the 
possible wrong determination of the value that the Plan could bring about. If the “current value”119 of 
the properties should exceed the value that a market could reach in the long run120, the federal state 
could experience a bankruptcy because it could be not able to pay the compensation for the properties. 
Maybe we need a clearer explanation of this possibility. If the state has to pay compensation for the 
                                                 
114 Eichengreen et al. 2004. A note: the article is written before the fifth version of the Plan was published. This is 
not relevant in this analysis, since there have not been significant changes between the forth and the fifth version of the Plan 
in these specific aspects 
115 Eichengreen et al. 2004:26 
116 Attachment 1 Art. 1 of Annex VII, UN Secretary-General, The comprehensive Settlement of the Cyprus Problem (5th 
version, 31/03/2004) 
117 Eichengreen et al. 2004:26 
118 Eichengreen et al. 2004:27 
119 In the definition of the Foundation Agreement. 
120 Equivalent to market value.  
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two thirds of the property that are not given back to the dispossessed owner, but the value of that 
property appears to be lower after a few years, the government (and so, indirectly, all the tax payers) 
looses money, because it will not be able to sell the property at a sufficient value. The bankruptcy is 
also linked to the fact that the brand new federal state, since its financial weakness is considered 
determined also by the very high debt ratio121 that the federal state should face. Eichengreen et al. 
suggested a different version of the Property Board122. This is because, according to them, this 
management of the property issue does not leave enough time to the market to be functioning, in order 
to stabilize the prices.  
Their proposal is to have a Property Board “as a close-end real estate fund”123, that would assume 
the ownership of the entire amount of the affected properties (at the beginning), and that could sell 
them at the market price after a few years. Then, the dispossessed owners would receive all the 
revenues collected by the Board, less the costs of the Board itself. This proposal might avoid the risk of 
bankruptcy that may be otherwise predictable, according to the Eichengreen et al. In fact, they state that 
there will be uncertainty caused by a lack of a “well-developed property market in the T/C constituent 
state”124. The economic risk of this uncertainty is kept by the brand new federal government. If the 
value at which the properties are evaluated – the so called “current value” – is higher than the market 
value125, then “the solution proposed by the Annan Plan is likely to bankrupt the federal government at 
its very beginning”126. A bankruptcy means above all the loss of all the compensations, since the 
Foundation Agreement provides them to be paid in bonds127. For the discussion above, it seems that the 
financial considerations of the evaluation of the properties are not considered in a long-term 
perspective in the property management of the Foundation Agreement, and the consequences for the 
brand new federal states could have been problematic. 
   A last aspect of the property management that should be analysed is the possible demographic 
effects that the property redistribution could have brought. Could the property redistribution have been 
also a way to have a more mixed pattern of settlement, regarding the two communities that live in 
                                                 
121 The public debt’s percentage of the GDP. Regarding the ca presented, it is estimated in more than 100% of the GDP, in 
Eichengreen et al. 2004:27 
122 Eichengreen et al. 2004:27 
123 Eichengreen et al. 2004:29 
124 Eichengreen et al. 2004:29 
125 As briefly described before 
126 Eichengreen et al. 2004:29 
127 Foundation Agreement: Annex VII, art. 8.3A 
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Cyprus? Or, vice versa, will it keep a stuck situation in which the people are totally split in the 
boundaries of the two constituent states, between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots? It is 
unfortunately impossible for us to give precise answers to these questions, since the way in which the 
property management is organized by the Annan Plan leaves some key decisions to the single owners, 
and we obviously cannot predict those decisions. 
In the areas subjected to the border adjustment, all the dispossessed owners (mainly Greek 
Cypriots) have, as mentioned, the right to have the entire property back and we tend to believe128 that, 
since the territory would have been under the Greek Cypriot Administration, they would have claimed 
for those properties. The current users could have stayed in those areas only under certain conditions, 
explained in Attachment 3 of Annex VII. Consequently, it is logic to think that in the areas that would 
have passed under the control of the Greek Cypriots the mixture between the two communities would 
have been limited. More contacts could have spread around the border, as mentioned before, but the 
two groups would have, even if maybe not completely, kept the actual separation. 
   In the other areas that would not have been involved in the border change provided by the 
Annan Plan, we think that the “1/3rd Rule” would have probably been a weak means for motivating 
people to move to the other constituent state. We cannot have any prove for that, and we did not find 
any academic work about that, but we consider more probable that the most people would have chosen 
to have compensation, and they would not have settled permanently in the other constituent state. The 
small landowners could, according to the Plan, have the whole property back and this would initially 
give them better opportunities to resettle permanently. They could have probably decided to move and 
have the property back. However, after the long period of territorial division other considerations can 
also be important, because the refugees would have formed new networks and sources of income in the 
sector they moved to after the violence. This could have created feeling of belonging to a specific 
community, and to be part of a land with an identity, that is not the same as he/she could find in the 
other part of the island. Concluding, our idea is that the Plan would not have been able to create a more 
locally integrated society, at least in the short term.  
                                                 
128 We have to use this kind of verbs, since, as said, everything is at the hypothetic level, and it is impossible to be sure 
about something that could have been chosen by the dispossessed owners. We will not stress it again, but this concept is 
valid for everything what follows. 
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3.4 Summary 
In this chapter we have analysed some aspects of the Foundation Agreement which deal with 
identity political as well as territorial issues. After a brief presentation of key aspects of the Annan 
Plan, we have worked on the comparison with the first document that should solve the problem of 
power distribution between the dominant ethnic groups in Cyprus 40 years ago, i.e. the constitution of 
1960. We have also stressed the attempt by the Annan Plan of giving the unification also a cultural 
aspect, that has been historically important for relations between the two communities. 
In order to better understand the Cyprus case, it can be useful to look back to the theoretical 
approach of chapter 1. We think that Rupesinghe’s explanation of the possible conflict resolution in a 
multi-ethnic societies can be useful for our discussion. He states that the “mobilization process for 
political autonomy would depend on certain conditions” which relate to the different outcomes of 
ethnic stratification from a conflict resolution perspective129. From this, we can say that the 1960 
constitution aimed to secure a balance between the dominant majority and the minority group which 
had a high level of participation within a ‘relatively cohesive system’130. This means that the 
constitution of 1960 was created with the aim of protecting the minority by the application of the 
consociational democracy based on power sharing.  
Focusing on the identity problem, we can assert that, the Constitution defined Republic of Cyprus 
as a state for its only citizens, the Cypriot people, but still acknowledged the different interests of 
Turkish and Greek Cypriots in the political system based on power sharing. Even if the two 
communities had different languages, religions, traditions and cultures they lived relatively mixed 
across the island, but the constitution did not manage to solve the problems regarding the autonomy 
and identity of the citizens. From 1963 to 1973, the relationship between the two communities got 
worse and worse and, as mentioned in chapter two, resulted in the territorial division of the island from 
1974 and the establishment of TRNC in the Northern sector. This is a significant historical factor in the 
premises for the old constitution and the proposal, which was voted for in the referendum, because the 
1960 constitution provided for a non-territorial power sharing system, in opposition to the territorial 
federal government that the Annan Plan provided for. 
 
                                                 
129 Rupesinghe 1996:16 
130 Rupesinghe 1996:16 
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With regards to the aspects of territorial adjustment and redistribution of immobile property, we 
can basically distinguish between the disagreements linked to the economical aspects that the Plan 
deals with and modify, and the ones linked to the cultural and social aspects, and so with “identity” at 
many levels. Economics and culture find in the physical place the base of their development. The 
aspects of the land, and so the border issue and the management of the properties, can consequently be 
seen not just as geo-political and institutional decisions, but also as part of the core dealing with the 
identity and with the cultural aspects of a group of people. In this sense, we find that these issues are 
clearly relate to the definition of Rupesinghe of protracted conflicts as “collisions between projects”131. 
Therefore, the management of the land and the properties is an important aspects of what constitutes 
Cyprus as a “space for intervention” (see chapter 1), and the Annan Plan sets up complex procedures 
for the settlement of especially the property redistribution issue which aim to modify the fact that the 
territorial division from 1974 is not annulled.  
On the one hand, the Annan Plan can be said to reflect the historical developments from 1964 and 
on the other hand we can say that it tried to answer some of the problems of the constitution of 1960. It 
still recognised a Cypriot identity, but would nevertheless have divided the two communities 
geographically, recognizing the population as Cypriot citizens first, and then as Turkish Cypriot or 
Greek Cypriot person, too132. From the perspective of Rupesinghe, we can say that this means that, in 
comparison to the 1960 constitution, the Annan Plan increases the power division between the two 
communities and that they can now be defined as more based in and functioning within their respective 
territories.
                                                 
131 Rupesinghe, Kumar & Tishkov, Valery A., Ethnicity and Power in the Contemporary World, United Nations University 
Press, 1996, page 25 
132 Foundation Agreement: Main Articles, 3. 
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4 The Politics of the Referendum 
Do you approve the Foundation Agreement with all its Annexes, as well as the 
constitution of the Greek Cypriot/Turkish Cypriot State and the provisions as to the 
law to be in force to bring into being a new state of affairs in which Cyprus joins 
the European Union united?133 
This complex question was posed in the dual referendum held in both sectors of Cyprus, and to 
which a majority of “yes-votes” was needed in both sectors for the draft constitution of the Annan Plan 
to be implemented. In this chapter, we wish to discuss and analyse the political debate related to the 
referendum that were, as previously mentioned, held on 24 April 2004. We shall do this by initially 
presenting a selection of interpretations of the process and result of the Cyprus referendum as a process 
of political decision making (section 4.1). To elaborate on these outlines, we shall analyse the 
positioning of leading politician in the two sectors in two ways. Firstly, we shall analyse the differences 
between positions taken among the main political parties along with public opinion polls, thereby 
providing an overview of the pre-referendum political environment (section 4.2). Secondly, we shall 
analyse the positions of Tassos Papadopoulos and Rauf Denktaş who have been chief negotiators in the 
Annan Plan process by virtue of their claims to being Presidents of the Republic of Cyprus and of 
Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus respectively (section 4.3). The chapter will be closed with a 
summary of the problems and perspectives, which we find in the course of our discussions.  
4.1 Analysing referendums 
In the following, we wish to present a range of texts interpreting the result of the Cypriot 
referendum concerning the adoption of the UN Foundation Agreement for the United Cyprus Republic. 
Firstly, we aim to clarify which concrete process related conditions during the actual referendum or in 
the preparation phase, which may have influenced the results of the vote. Secondly, we shall discern 
from these texts some overall interpretations that can be made about the referendum as a means of 
conflict resolution that has been implemented in the case of Cyprus. In order to place these 
interpretations within a conceptual framework, we begin by presenting a set of theoretical reflections 
                                                 
133 Jakobsson-Hatay 2004a. 
A Failed Attempt of Conflict Resolution: The Case of Cyprus 
 
 59
on the concept of referendum and of its use as a tool in political decision-making and conflict 
resolution.  
According to David Butler and Austin Ranney, the institution of referendum is mainly used in 
Western Europe in political decision making as a supplement to the processes of representative 
democracy, when political leaders wish to maximise the popular participation in a decision and thus 
maximise the legitimacy of the decision134. This is due to the fact that democratic regimes, as opposed 
to authoritarian regimes, depend much more on “the consent of citizens rather than on the coercive 
power of governments to ensure the rule of law”135. In a Western European context, the wish or need to 
maximise the legitimacy of a particular decision, has mainly prompted the use of referendums to reach 
a conclusion on two types of issues, namely “(1) constitutional, including territorial issues, and (2) 
”moral” issues, such as abortion or the prohibition of alcohol”136. Such questions motivate the use of 
the institution of referendum, states Bogdanor, because they either cut across traditional party-political 
lines or are relatively irreversible, as in the case of territorial divisions or integration. Particularly, the 
case of constitutional or territorial issues “arguably go beyond the mandate that legislators are given at 
a general election, in that they involve altering the very framework of the political system”137. The 
same perception of the referendum as an instrument in political decision making is presented by Pier 
Vincenzo Uleri, who points out that  
Sometimes they [referendums] have made life more complicated for governments, 
parliaments and political parties, sometimes they have been useful instruments to 
solve difficulties that these bodies seem unable or unwilling to tackle.138 
This general remark effectively points to a number of issues that must be considered in the 
analysis of a particular referendum, in our case the Cypriot referendum. Along the same line, Uleri 
specifies three approaches to or aspects of the institution of referendum, which will guide an analysis, 
                                                 
134 David Butler and Austin Ranney write as adjunct scholars of the American Enterprise Institute and have both published 
books on elections and politics in democratic states. They first edited ’Referendums around the World’ in 1978, which is now 
published in a 2nd, updated version in 1994.  
135 Butler & Ranney 1994:14-15. We are aware of the complexity of the concept of democracy which the use of referendums 
is part of. For the purpose of our discussion we shall however not discuss the validity of the general polical scientific claim 
that Western European states constitute democracies.  
136 Vernon Bogdanor in Butler & Ranney 1994:89. Vernon Bogdanor writes as a fellow of Brasenose College, Oxford (UK), 
and has published several studies of European constitutions.  
137 Bogdanor in Butler & Ranney 1994:90. 
138 Uleri in Gallagher & Uleri 1996:1. Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri write as lecturers in Political Science and have 
both written and edited books on political and democratic issues in European contexts.  
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stating that “[the] referendum phenomenon (...) can be analysed in terms of mobilisation and political 
participation, and of legitimation, as well as being viewed as a decision-making process”139. The 
general approach taken in Gallagher & Uleri’s anthology thus points to the questions of how or whether 
the political actors can function as representatives of the population on the topic of the referendum, of 
who initiates the referendum and how other political actors react to it, and finally the question of how 
the referendum connects to the “everyday” political structures in place in the given context. The use of 
referendums thus entails both legal, political and discursive processes and problems.  
Questioning these issues can identify the central premises of the referendum as well as some key 
problems, as they have been interpreted in hindsight. While this can serve quite effectively to clarify 
the actors and legislative measures activated in the process, it does not, however, illuminate the 
qualitative aspects of a referendum. This could be such as the nature of the arguments presented in 
favor of or against the question put to vote, or what kind of public organisation takes place up to a 
referendum, affecting the political atmosphere as well as the outcome of referendum. In that sense, 
Gallagher & Uleri – along with Butler & Ranney – take an approach to referendums which focuses on 
the processes and problems based in the level of the state, through a state-centric, realist approach. 
While their conceptual frame thus far outlined can be useful to mark the political-institutional features 
of the Cypriot referendum, we need a different set of concepts to grasp how the referendum is used as a 
tool of international conflict resolution in the historical context of a territorial dispute and political 
violence.  
In her article discussing the Cypriot referendum, the peace and conflict researcher Ann-Sofi 
Jakobsson Hatay140 describes the use of referendums from a perspective which can function as the 
supplement needed, as she specifically presents different uses of referendums as a tool in conflict 
resolution141. Hatay’s approach is by no means oppositional to the one presented above, but rather 
specifies how the referendum can be used in the historical and political context of conflict between two 
or more groups within a state: 
As the Cyprus example illustrates, the holding of popular referendum has come to 
play an increasingly important role in contemporary peace processes. The 
                                                 
139 Uleri in Gallagher & Uleri:1. 
140 Hatay is a researcher at the Peace Research Institute at Uppsala University and has published several articles on the 
Cyprus conflict and comparative studies of the Cypriot and Northern Irish conflict.  
141 Hatay 2004b. 
A Failed Attempt of Conflict Resolution: The Case of Cyprus 
 
 61
predominance of intrastate conflicts in the post-Cold War era has brought decisions 
pertaining to war and peace onto the domestic political arena.142  
While conflicts have previously been perceived and analysed in terms of international politics 
and inter-state conflict, the intra-state conflicts of the post-Cold War era have engendered a range of 
new methods of conflict resolution, of which the referendum may be the one pinpointing the interest in 
maximal legitimacy and popular participation as the foundation of a negotiated peace. However, 
Bogdanor argues directly against the use of referendums in societies divided by cultural differences 
such as language, nationality, or religion, because it may lead to an intensification of the existing 
tension. Bogdanor thus argues that referendums are better suited to “a society based on majority rule”, 
because “[a divided society] in order to obtain stability, needs to employ strategies that depart from the 
majoritarian model”143. Hatay also points to the risk of intensifying division as one potential, negative 
outcome, but places it among a set of possible outcomes and problems, depending on the concrete 
conditions and form of the referendum and the nature of the question put to vote.  
In any case, Hatay observes a tendency to give the referendum the function of a potential means 
to defusing tensions, precisely because of the maximum legitimacy associated with this type of political 
decision making. Thus, “a referendum gives people a veto on the outcome of negotiations, and may 
therefore enhance the legitimacy of the peace process”144. She connects this tendency to a  
(..) general trend to encourage the active participation of citizens in political 
processes, peace processes among them. And in the best of circumstances, a 
referendum can contribute to a process of democratic deliberation and thus enhance 
democracy as well as peace.145  
The use of referendums thus connects with ideal of democratic participation and the state getting 
its legitimacy in the people, i.e. the UN ideal of national self-determination (see section 3.1). In the 
words of Rupesinghe, the referendum can thus be implemented as a means of conflict transformation in 
the sense that it can clarify or indicate whether popular opinion in mainly swaying towards the support 
                                                 
142 Hatay 2004b:1. 
143 Bogdanor in Butler & Ranney 1994:88. Bogdanor points to Switzerland as the only exception to this generalisation, 
because the frequent use of the referendum in ”everyday politics” has meant that majority/minority divisions no longer have 
the same political meaning (Bogdanor in Butler & Ranney 1994:88). Switzerland uses a variant of the consociational model 
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or rejection of the current direction or the result of political peace negotiations146. The conflict 
transformation would then also be a strategy of conflict resolution aimed at securing popular 
participation as a foundation for legitimacy, which may ideally work as a kind of decentralisation and 
strengthening of the peace process.  
4.2 Interpreting the Cypriot referendum  
As mentioned above, Uleri points out that a referendum can be analysed in terms of its 
mobilisation and popular participation, of legitimation, and as a decision making process. In the 
following, we shall present interpretations made by Hatay alongside those made by the anthropologist 
Rebecca Bryant, ordering their arguments according to the distinctions made by Uleri147. In terms of 
mobilisation and popular participation, we shall distinguish between the pre-referendum process and 
the actual referendum, as both Hatay and Bryant point out that there is a remarkable difference in the 
proliferation of public debate about the content of the Annan Plan between the Turkish and Greek parts 
of Cyprus148. According to Bryant this relates to a more general problem of democracy in the Republic 
of Cyprus (Southern sector), i.e. that the ”Greek Cypriot politics has long been centralized and party-
oriented (...)”, coinciding with a low level of popular participation in political debate149. Furthermore, 
Bryant points to the phenomenon of ’Denkashopoulos’ which refers to the problem that the presidents, 
functioning as leaders of the Annan Plan negotiations, are both authoritarian leaders who have been 
engaged in the politics of conflict during the past 30-40 years and therefore not adequate as main 
characters in reaching a definite and sustainable solution to the conflict150.  
Regardless of the differences in pre-referendum participation, it should be noted that the 
electorate turn out at the referendum, as mentioned in chapter 3, was quite high in both parts, with 90 % 
of the Greek Cypriot and 86 % of the Turkish Cypriot electorates voting151. This ensured a high level of 
participation which is one of the key arguments for using referendums in political decision making, as 
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Butler and Ranney state152. Practically, the informed participation was, however, restricted by the fact 
that the subject of the vote, the fifth version of the Foundation Agreement was not published until 31st 
of March. This gave the electorate only three weeks to evaluate the draft constitution and related texts 
comprising a full 9,000 pages altogether. As Bryant puts it, “its [the plan’s] obesity became a stumbling 
block (...)” for those promoting the plan153.   
While the high turn out and also the pre-referendum mobilisation at least in the Turkish Cypriot 
part support the impression of a legitimate popular decision making process, the rejectionist stances of 
both presidents who functioned as negotiators do weaken the legitimacy of the Annan Plan itself as a 
durable peace plan. Both presidents are described as expressing strong nationalist views, which both 
Bryant and Hatay interpret as problematic to the successful implementation of the Annan Plan, or even 
any peace plan at all154. The positions of the presidents furthermore point to a decisive problem when 
reviewing the referendum process as a decision making process. Particularly Hatay points to the 
problem that the Annan Plan on crucial aspects is mainly the product of the UN as a third party and not 
an agreement negotiated by the conflicting parties who are thus not directly committing themselves to 
supporting any compromises set up in the plan155. This is particularly problematic because Annan had 
demanded the mandate to determine the points of contention which the parties would not make 
compromises on. This implies a risk that the greatest markers of disagreement or conflict become the 
points where one or both parties claim lack of influence and ownership on the plan. The effect has been 
that the plan was put to the vote without the “stamp of approval” of the negotiating representatives, 
Papadopoulos and Denktaş, and that “there were no local stakeholders around” which had committed 
themselves to supporting the plan156.  
Apart from these general evaluations of the referendum, Hatay also outlines some possible 
explanations to why there was a remarkable difference in the results of the two referendums. She 
primarily seeks the explanations in the political circumstances surrounding the referendum, pointing to 
five factors of importance: 
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 Public debate and circulation of information from different sources began much earlier in the 
Turkish Cypriot part;  
 The government of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus represents the largest pro-
Annan Plan party, and the largest opposition party likewise supported the plan, while the 
only party consistently supporting the plan in the Southern sector was the small EDI party 
having less than three per cent of electorate votes; 
 The Greek Cypriot media afforced a much larger amount of broadcasting hours to 
rejectionists than advocates of the Annan Plan. Bryant (2004) comments that President 
Papadopoulos actually owns 33 per cent of all Greek Cypriot media and claims that he has 
controlled them in order to promote his own stance on the matter;  
 While Turkish Cypriots as well as UN and EU representatives have claimed that the 
referendum represented the last chance for reaching a sustainable solution and thus the last 
chance for peace, Papadopoulos has not accepted this as a valid premise for the referendum 
and repeatedly stated that a rejection of the Annan Plan would enable renegotiations which 
would strengthen the position of the Greek Cypriots; 
 Finally, exit polls indicate that 70% of ’no’-voters rejected the plan due to concerns about 
’security’, because Turkey, like Greece and UK, retained their right to intervene as 
guarantors under the Annan Plan as well157.  
 
With the referendum being decisive and thereby legally binding to all parties involved, 
advocating as well as rejectionist arguments to the Foundation Agreement of the Annan Plan 
dominated politics in both sectors of the island during the months preceding the referendum. From 
Hatay’s analysis, it should be clear that this process took place both among political parties and among 
the general population, although to a different extent in the two sectors. We shall elaborate on this issue 
in the following section. 
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4.3 The Pre-referendum political environment  
In the following text we aim to analyse the situation that has led to the result of the 24th April 
Cyprus referendum. This referendum is characterized by some peculiarities, of which one outstanding 
is that such referendum has been carried out simultaneously in the two sectors of the island, and for the 
approval of the issue in question, as mentioned in the introduction, it needed the affirmative answer by 
the majority in both sectors, independently of the total number of people who had voted for "YES" or 
for "NO" for the adoption of the draft constitution.  
In this section, we aim to analyse the process of the decision making by the principal parties. In 
particular we will deal with two moments of the pre referendum period: the first one between March 
and April 2004, when the parties had only a generical idea on the position that they would have taken, 
and the second one, one week before the referendum.  
It is to hold in consideration that the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is recognized only by 
the Turkey, but has been treated like one regular nation. This choice, perhaps, is to emphasize the fair 
treatment for both the parts or for underlining the fact that if “YES" did not emerge from the 
referendum the international community should have to accept the two distinguished and independent 
communities.  
The analysis starts considering a discussion between the most representative political voices of 
both sides. 
This discussion was held at the end of March involving the First Minister Mehmet Ali Talat and 
the Premier Deputy and Minister of the Foreign Serdar Denktaş, all from the Turkish Cypriot part. 
They spoke mainly about the gains and the losses in which the Turkish Cypriot part of the island would 
incur after the referendum, in case of a “YES” or a “NO” result on the referendum. 
According to an article published on the newspaper “Turkey News”, three weeks before the 24th 
April158, Denktaş made public his position, and his doubts in regard to the plan, declaring that he  
Saw nothing in the plan that would merit his voting for it. 
 He declared that he cares for the issues regarding the property and all the other issues artificially 
resolved by the Annan Plan, and that he wasn’t completely satisfied, even if Papadopoulos recent 
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version of the document was clearly in favour of the Turkish Cypriots, thanks also to the initiative of  
Turkish delegations. 
The Turkish Cypriot leader in that period was under the pressure of the Justice and Development 
Party (AKP) of Ankara, lead by the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayip Erdogan that, like all the 
international community, pushed in order to support the Annan Plan. 
As reported on an article written the day of the referendum159, the main goal of the AKP was to 
increase the possibility for the Northern sector of the island to join the EU.  
In the last days before the referendum there has been the hugest division inner the government 
over the last thirty years. 
In regard to the entrance of the North of Cyprus into the EU, approved with favour from every 
isolates, Denktaş had its personal opinion that it seemed to declare his greater interest for the Turkey 
that for Cyprus “If Turkish Cypriots become the part of EU, Turkey would have to give up its’ existing 
rights on the island”. 160 In those days there were intense discussions between the major political 
personalities, as mentioned by many sources "President Denktaş has been informed through telegrams 
on every stage of the negotiations process"161. 
 The First Turkish Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan said in a conference, in answer to the 
complaints of the Turkish Cypriot leader that had not been sufficiently informed in regard to the 
evolutions of the plan.  
The article reports also the example of Palestine and Kosovo used by him, in support of his 
thesis. He said, referring at all the international community: "We have solved it, and then it’s to 
bloodbath"162. 
As a representative proof of the position of Denktaş, the article reports a previous declaration of 
him, in which he said that  
accepting the Annan Plan meant acceptance the extermination of the Turkish 
Cypriot presence in Cyprus and an end to Turkey’s presence on the island for 
which it is my duty to raise and opposed163. 
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The most important point in support of this kind of extremely pro-Turkey idea is that if the 
Annan Plan had passed, about 100,000 of Turkish Cypriots would move, some as half of the population 
on the North of the island.  
As reported by L. Leicht, Denktaş was supported only by a minor extremely right-wing and 
nationalist group in strictly contact with Turkey164. Denktaş obtained his power thirty years ago, when 
he military occupied the North of the island and gave live to the Turkish Republic of North Cyprus, 
even if it is still recognized only by Turkey. On the last parliamentary elections this party lost the 
consent of the people. This is also shown by the demonstration held in the North of the island in favor 
of the reunification. The only supports on which Denktaş could believe were, apart of some fascist 
groups, the one by the “Democratic Left Party” (DSP) of Bulent Ecevit, the same that planed the 
irruption of the Turkish troop in the island in 1974, and the one by the Islamic “Felicity Party” (SP) of 
Necmettin Erbakan, that was allied in the past with Ecevit, but that now doesn’t have a significant 
percentage of seats in parliament. 
The second part of our analysis aims at comparing two different opinion pools, one of the 30th 
March and the other one of the 18th April, at the eve of the referendum. These opinion pool were 
published by KADEM (Cyprus Social Research and Educational Consulting Centre) in the Turkish 
Cypriot newspaper KIBRIS. 
An opinion pool held during those days shows that a slight majority of 51.1% of the Turk-
Cypriots intent to vote in favour to the acceptance of the Foundation Agreement 165. 
The same survey, held in the Greek-Cypriot part has lead to the opposite result, as to say a slight 
majority of ballots contrary to the acceptance of the plan. 
The second reference article, the one of the 18th April, is “Poll in occupied Cyprus shows that one 
fourth of Dervis Eroglu end Serdan Dektas’s parties will vote "YES" in the referendum”. 
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4.3.1 RTP, DP, KKTC and BDH 
In the recent time, there was a slight removal of the DP from the National Unity Party (UBP). 
The DP was lead by the president’s son Serdar Denktaş that presents the characteristics of a more 
democratic and progressive leader, in spite of his strictly position anti-Greek chauvinism. 
In the article “Cypriot leaders on both sides ponder position for referendum”166 is declared that 
the Turkish Republican party (RTP) of Mehmed Ali Talat and the Democratic Party (DP) of Serdar 
Denktaş, the greatest political parties active in the North of Cyprus in a meeting had jointly analyzed 
the document of the UN. But while the RTP, had already begun its campaign in favour of a "YES", the 
coalition partner of the leader Serdar Denktaş, the DP, had not still taken one decision. In this condition 
of uncertainty if the Denktaş President resisted to the pressures of Ankara and the Government of the 
Turkish Republic of the North of Cyprus (KKTC) decided for an unfavorable decision to the Annan 
Plan, there would be an internal split between the two coalitions of the Government. But Talad declared 
that the Government will not have inner problems of differences of opinion between the coalitions 
partner  
We are a democracy and we may defend different views 
In spite of was clearly readable through its words we can see his desire to see his partner DP and 
the Denktaş President to enter in the alliance with the RTP for a vigorous campaign in favor of "YES". 
Equally favorable to a solution is the Party “Movement of Peace and Democracy "(BDH) of Mustafa 
Akinci, who encouraged President Denktaş  
Not to be an obstacle for peace. 
The RTP held the line that it had promised, so at the second exit pool it was also strongly in 
support of the “YES” vote. 
The RTP party remained sticky on the same point and it registered the highest percentage of 
adhesions to the plan167. In fact the Foundation Agreement has been supported from more or less 94,5% 
leaders and supporters.  
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The DP, on the contrary, changed its position.  The position of the DP party had almost the same 
characteristics of party NUP. It had tried to maintain its position along neutrality regarding the Annan 
Plan, but from the declarations of the leaders it was easy to intuit that it was mainly inclined for "NO". 
However, the persons favorable to "YES" were in greater number then those rejecting the in NUP 
party. The leader of the DP said that he did not want to influence nobody, and that everyone would 
have voted what he or her believed. Approximately 28% of the supporters of the DP would have voted 
"YES", however, objectively, the party seemed to want to refuse the Annan Plan.  
4.3.2 National Movement Front 
Unfortunately, we have the report of only one article about the National Movement Front168, 
formed of what remain of the minors conservatory political party and some NGOs, under the control of 
the National Unity Party (UBP) of the previous First minister Dervis Eroglu. In the article is declared 
that the position of this political party three weeks before the referendum was of a not confirmed "NO", 
but they was continuing to analyze the plan of the UN. 
Continuing to consider the same article, it is possible to already notice that one month before the 
referendum the situation in the Greek part of the island was different.  
4.3.3 New Horizons Party 
New Horizons Party did not wait too long for declare its “NO” in regard to the decision to accept 
the plan of the UN, as to say that there was no questions or doubts about it. 
4.3.4 DISY and AKEL 
 The party named DISY of the former Greek-Cypriot leader Glafcos Clerides and the Communist 
Party AKEL, the greater political party in the Greek-Cypriot area, seem slightly favorable for a “YES”. 
The Conservative Party DISY and the Communist AKEL together have the support of 60% of the 
Greek-Cypriot voters.  
In the Greek part of Cyprus the situation was quite unclear, and it was impossible to risk a 
prospect of the result of the referendum, also if the “NO” was actually more probable than the “YES”. 
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The Greek-Cypriot leader Tassos Papadopoulos declared that at the beginning of April he would 
have decided to support or not the plan of the UN, although he had already wide criticized the last 
version of the plan. 
On the article already mentioned previously we can find information about other parties of the 
Turkish part169. The information are detailed, because the survey was held one week before the 
referendum, when was supposed that every actors would have taken their positions. 
4.3.5 NUP 
In that article it was clearly delineated the line that would have taken this political party on the 
imminent referendum: a quarter of the National Unity Party (NUP) of Dervis Eroglu and of the 
Democratic Party (DP) of Serdan Denktaş would have voted "YES" to the referendum of the 24th  
April. The survey was elaborated between the 11th and the 16th April, and 1815 people in 70 various 
areas have been interviewed. As it can be noticed from the opinion pool, the supporters of party NUP 
do not approve at all the campaign in favor of “NO”, in contrast to the Annan Plan, that the leaders of 
the party support. Nearly a quarter (21.5%) of the members of the NUP has asserted that would have 
voted “YES "to the referendum, in spite of some issues still open. What it seemed, is that the leaders of 
the NUP had followed the line held from Mr. Raulf Denktaş from when the Annan Plan has begun, and 
for which a "no solution" is preferable than the status quo, in contrast with what the supporters of the 
party wished. In conclusion the NUP a week before the referendum only seemed an inner divided party. 
4.3.6 CJP 
Another party adverse to the re-unification was the CJP, Cyprus Justice Party, where only 33.3% 
of the supporters have declared of being favorable to the plan. The representative declaration removes 
every doubt. 
We shall be doomed, we shall die if the Annan Plan is accepted 
On the other hand, according to the analysis of the article170 already used, it is possible to 
understand which parties supported the strong “YES” emerged on the referendum.   
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4.3.7 PMD  
The PMD, the "Peace and Democracy Movement" was the second in favorable adhesions with 
90,7% 
4.3.8 SEUP  
Also the SEUP, Solution and EU Party, as the name says, was favourable to a solution and to the 
joining the EU, with 80% of ballots on favour of the Annan Plan. 
4.4 The Quantification of the Information  
It is demonstrated in a survey carried out by KADEM that seem that there is a direct relation 
between the level of information about the Annan Plan and the vote decision on the referendum171. 
Although only a few days were left to the people after the presentation of the definitive version of the 
Annan Plan, the 74,4% of the people thought to be informed in regard to the plan, while a minority of 
15.3% declared to be “not informed at all”. In regard to the same question, 14.8% felt themselves "very 
informed", 29.6% "informed enough" and 30% "not very informed", 10.3% didn’t answer. Observing 
the relation of the level of information and what the people would effectively have voted at the 
referendum, the result is that the informed people are also those that would have voted "YES". 
This result is a confirm by other sources172, which report that in the Turkish part spent a lot of 
time preparing the people to the referendum. Since 2002 they began to “educate the electorate” and for 
almost all the population seemed natural to vote “YES”.  
In support to Rebecca Bryant and to the issue of the time employed in preparing the people for 
the day of the referendum, there is also an asserted of Phileleftheros in another article173. Still in 2003, 
in sight of the elections of the government who would have lead the North of Cyprus towards every 
possible implication on the issue "unit or division" the people looked at what could implicate giving the 
power to one government or to another one. In these elections the Turkish Cypriots could have elected 
a nationalistic government or a government in favor of the unification. 
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The Turkish Cypriots opposition has turned the December elections into some kind 
of a pre-referendum on the settlement of the Cyprus issue. 
In the North of Cyprus, the civil population has moved in pacifist manifestations in support to the 
5th Annan Plan. An example are the volunteers of the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH) that 
have distributed 10000 brochure with messages in favor of "YES", in Nicosia, Kyrenia, Morphou, 
Famagusta and Iskele174. 
On the contrary, on the Greek sector, they didn’t spend a lot of time on the Annan Plan, “certain 
of their own future as the wealthiest of the new EU member state”175. 
 “The people arrived unprepared at the vote, 70 per cent of them declare to not understand the 
plan, for the most the parts concerning the property and territory issues”176. In regard the access to the 
EU in case of reunification, the Greek part could face serious problems because the Turkish side did 
not respect every parameters necessary in order to allow the entrance in the EU, and could have been 
an obstacle for join some monetary institutions as, for example, Economic and Monetary Union, and so 
meaning division more than unification. 
The plan was presented to them in bits of propaganda and in diatribes of the 
church, many of whose leaders condemned the plan as “satanic” (expression of a 
leader of the Cypriot Orthodox Church) and threatened their flocks with damnation 
if they voted in favour.177 
The conduct held by the Greek Cypriots has been moreover condemned from the European 
Parliament, which supported the fairness of the Annan Plan and criticized anyone against it with the 
accusation that their campaigns were based on wrong information178.  
The strong opposition to the Annan Plan of the Greek Cypriots was openly supported also from 
the parliamentarians. For instance, Aleksandros Alavanos asserted that in any case, being attached to 
the Annan plan a protocol that must have been signed within one specified date, and, not being be 
respected this rule, the referendum should have been to consider however null. This affirmation has 
been supported at the unanimity from the Greek Cypriots present at the conference. Another Greek 
Cypriot PM asserted clearly that  
                                                 
174Ortam, 10/07/2003 
175 Bryant, 12/05/2004 
176 Bryant, 12/05/2004 
177 Bryant, 12/05/2004 
178 Kibris, 15/04/2004 
A Failed Attempt of Conflict Resolution: The Case of Cyprus 
 
 73
“With the acceptance of the Annan Plan, they would be placed under the rule of Turkey. Turkey 
wouldn’t protect the Greek Cypriot’s rights […] Majority is against this Plan”179 
As already mentioned, also the colonialist power had an important influence. The island obtained 
the independence from the Britain Empire in 1960, which maintained a strict control on the island 
thanks to the Turkish Cypriot police at the service of them. The Britain was also accused of having no 
reaction to the terrorism attacks of the Turk nationalist TMT in offence to the Greek part. The colonial 
power found his support on the Stalinist party AKEL, the biggest active party and leader of the trade 
union. 
In regard of the “Enosis” (annexation to Greece), the most influent party was the EOKA of 
Georgios Grivas, the anticommunist army officer that led a open conflict, became terrorist, against 
British, Greek left and Turkish Cypriots. This party boasts the support of the US, which was in favor of 
annexing Cyprus with Greek, but allowed Turkey to maintain a military presence on the island. In more 
recent time, with the increasing of the strategic value of Turkey, its power increased. 
The island is divided since the right-push led by Nikos Sampson supported by EOKA, and the 
answer of the invention of the Turkish troops, in 1974. 
4.5 The Media at the Service of Politics 
The main reason of the Greek Cypriot propaganda is, as mentioned above, that  
Papadopoulos owns 33 per cent shares of the three largest private television station 
in the south180,  
And so he manipulated the media in his favour, didn’t leave space for any adverse point of view. 
In the conference of the 7th April, two weeks before the referendum, the Greek President Tassos 
Papadopoulos held extremely meaningful speech in which started with a pseudo-neutral line, as he 
said: 
The critical nature of the decision we are called upon to take collectively and 
individually does not allow for competition as to who is more and who less 
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patriotic. We all have the same goal and we all have the same anxiety for the nature 
of our homeland 181 
Always in this conference he speaks about unity: 
Therefore, safeguarding our unity is our highest duty to our country182 
But it was not clear if with “our” if he meant the entire island or only the Greek part. 
Later he added: 
There was only one criterion of my assessment, to serve the interest and safeguard 
the rights of the people of Cyprus in its entirety, Greek Cypriots and Turkish 
Cypriots. This is what my conscience dictates to me183 
This is the conclusion of the introduction of his speech, when he spoke to both parties, the Greek 
and the Turkish one. It sound quite fair and neutral and it seems he want the voters to choose 
completely freely. This contrasts with what reported on the article “An ironic result in Cyprus”, where 
is declared that 
The broadcast media put a heavily negative spin on the plan, and leading EU 
diplomats complained that they had not been allowed to explain their own views on 
the plan184 
 Papadopoulos in his speech went on declaring: 
I bear the heavy burden of the responsibility for conducting the negotiations and 
the duty to state publicity with sincerely and frankness my own assessment on my 
part to impose my choice on you, but offered as a guideline to be assessed also by 
you185 
Papadopoulos in his propaganda-speech aimed to raise the attention of the Greek Cypriot on the 
main point that could support at his affirmations. He figured out several elements, such as economical, 
political, linked with propriety, identity, access to EU and so on, comparing for each one the situation 
of the Greek side of the island in opposition with the Turkish one. This was an extremely simple way to 
show to the voters that the situation in the Southern part was superior to the Turkish one, and that the 
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Greek side had only to loose by the reunification under the rules imposed by the Annan Plan. As he 
said in his speech  
 “In the 5th Annan Plan there are improvements compared to the 3rd and 4th Annan 
Plan. These improvements do not satisfy the minimum demands that we submitted. 
Neither as regards the functionality of the plan nor as regards its being ready to be 
implemented on the day following the referendum, nor as regards the substantive 
reunification of our country in the economic, fiscal and monetary sector”186 
 
And later: 
I want to stress that all our demands, which were fully documented were within the 
parameters of the Annan Plan and did not take away rights that the Annan Plan 
provided tour Turkish Cypriot compatriots. In contrast, the Turkish side submitted 
eleven demands which affect negatively the interests of the Greek Cypriots and 
which have adopted in the final Anna Plan. […] It is with pain that I conclude that 
even with the most flexible and lenient judgment, the final Anna Plan does not 
satisfy the minimum aims we have set. Our most suitable proposals were not 
accepted. Even in the provision that have been improved, we ascertain functional 
difficulties, complicated procedures and dangerous ambiguities.187 
Verheugen expresses the opinion of the EU in regard of the economic issue and the asset of 
Cyprus, the EU Enlargement Commissioner is that 
If the Greek Cypriots say no in the forthcoming referendum and Turkish Cypriots 
say yes, the EU will take measures to end the financial and economic isolation of 
the North”, that like the title says, doesn’t need of ulterior explanations.188 
 
At the final negotiation of the Annan Plan, one intensely discussed point was the one that give to 
Turkey the role of one of the guarantors, in some extremely dangerous cases, as political collapse. It 
was the idea of the Greek sector that this is an abuse of power, illegally granted by the UN. In fact, 
doesn’t seem fair that a Nation that occupied half the island over thirty years becomes the guarantor of 
peace. 
Papadopoulos, emphasize this point in his speech and the authorized presence of Turkish troop. 
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The permanent stationing of even a small number of Turkish troops in Cyprus, 
with extended intervention rights in the Greek Cypriot state with no mechanism of 
guarantee,” (He use guarantee, because he doesn’t fell the Turkish troop as an 
instrument of peace for everyone in the island, but rather a threat for them – the 
Greek Cypriot) “while we would have disbanded the National Guard, creates 
conditions of insecurity for the Greek Cypriots. The colonization and the 
continuing presence of Turkish troops in Cyprus, do not serve either the Greek 
Cypriots or the Turkish Cypriots, but Turkey alone.189 
In regard with the economical aspects, the difference between the North and the South was 
hugely different. The condition of living of the people of the North of Cyprus is going worst and worst 
since the military occupation of the island that put the North in a condition of substantial international 
isolation and embargo. It is easy to know that The economical situation in the two part of the island, as 
mentioned before, was extremely canted, “The average per capita income in the North is 3000 US 
dollars compared to about 13000 US dollars in the South”190, and Papadopoulos put evidence on this 
aspect, also if in contrast with what claimed by the Turkish part.  
The implementation of the relevant provision entails unbearable economic effects 
for the Greek Cypriots, while the whole structure of the plan would lead, if not to 
the collapse of the Cyprus economy, surely to a serious economic crisis and 
adverse repercussions on the Greek Cypriots standard of living that we have built 
with so many sacrifices191 
For what concerns the economic issue, the point of view of the people of the North of Cyprus was 
very different. Who was right and who was not it cannot be said, and, above all nobody can observe 
what would have happened in the case of re-unification of the island, being emerged "NO" at the 
referendum of the 24th April. It is a fact, however, that also the economic issue had carried out its part 
in the propaganda previous the referendum, and has been used in opposite way by the two parts. What 
was seen like damage by the Greek Cypriots was seen like an advantage by the Turkish Cypriots192. 
The Ankara Anatolia news agency exposed the result of the encounter between the minister of the 
foreign countries and deputy First Minister of Turkey Mr. Abdullah Gul, Mr. Mehmet Wings Talat, 
leader of the Republican Turkish Party (RTP) and the leader of the Democratic Party (DP). The 
conference was centralized regarding economic aspect of the Annan Plan and the possible 
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reconciliation, and it took the name of "Meeting on Economic Dimension of Annan' s Plan", organized 
in Ankara from the Turkish Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges (TUCCE). Mr. Gul 
declared that for every result emerged from the referendum, Turkey would have supported the Turkish 
Cypriots. Mr. Gul also added that if both the parts had voted "YES" in the simultaneous referendum, 
then a real change of the situation would be start. Adding then, like an interpretation of the “change”, 
he meant than they could have undertaken new initiatives in cooperation between Greece, Turkey and 
Cyprus of which all would have benefited.  
Mr. Talat continued asserting that the negotiation of the Annan Plan could be effective only when 
two conditions had taken place:  
• In the Turkish part of Cyprus, a real and substantial engagement for the promotion of the re-
unification.  
• In Turkey, the election of a Government able to lead the State inside the EU.  
Talat dared defining the situation like "insoluble", but explaining that this is not to mean "without 
solution", but that it is not possible to apply to the present situation in Cyprus a pre-manufactured 
international solution, being the present situation in Cyprus absolutely original. Talat said that some 
smaller groups consider the status-quo acceptable and sustainable for the future, but that he and the 
majority of the Turkish Cypriots are absolutely not of the same opinion. 
Mr. Serdan Denktaş asserted that the private sector in Turkey and in the state of the North of 
Cyprus would have a faster development and new investments surely would be undertaken in short 
time. He said also that in case in which the result of the referendum was negative, the Greek Cypriots 
will notice that the unification would have been favorable for both. 
Statistical materials tell that 79% of that Greek Cypriot people feel that the main reason to vote 
against the Annan Plan is “security”193. 
Other fonts state about this topic: 
US State Department Special coordinator for the Cyprus issue Thomas Weston 
expressed the hope that the accession of Cyprus to the European Union will give 
the Greek-Cypriots the feeling of security, which they felt the Annan Plan failed to 
guarantee. He argued that the negative result of the referendum is due to the 
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worries of Greek-Cypriots as far as security matters are concerned, which he 
himself shares194 
The US accused the Greek Cypriots for the "NO" emerged from the referendum. The accusations 
turned to the political leaders were mainly two: manipulation of the public opinion and limitation of the 
freedom of expression of the media. The US stated that in the South of the island the people had been 
opportunely instructed to vote "NO", so as to guarantee the failure of the referendum. 
As stated the State Department spokesman  
“We do think that there was a lot of manipulation by the Greek-Cypriot leaders in 
the run-up to the election. We also think that the outcome was regrettable but not 
surprising given those actions”195 
In its support took part Richard Boucher, who added that the press was strongly limited, and in 
the schools the teachers instructed the students to vote against the Annan Plan and they supplied them 
of T-shirt and flags with messages of refusal of the Plan. 
Also US secretary agreed with his connects and manifested his disappointment at the Greek 
Cypriots that have lost a unique occasion. 
4.6 The Opinion of Turkish Cypriots Before the Failure 
In the period just before the referendum, the public opinion of the Turkish Cypriots was mainly 
positive in regard to the adoption of the Foundation Agreement, above all the younger generation and 
the people of the district of Farmagusta. The optimism moreover seems to grow in relation to the level 
of education. From another survey of the KADEM, 14.8% are declared "very optimistic", 29.6% 
"rather optimistic", 30% do not have idea, 5.3% "more pessimist", and 0.7% "very pessimist"196. In 
relation to their political affiliations, the more pessimists are the supporters of NUP and DP parties that 
are also not even satisfied of the course of the situation. 
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4.7 The Politics of Spatial Representation 
In the weeks before the referendums, both leading negotiators and representatives of their 
respective communities Papadopoulos and Denktaş declared their opposition to the adoption of the 
Foundation Agreement designed in the Annan Plan and encouraged their peoples to vote against it197. 
Papadopoulos did this in one of the most significant speeches at that time (as mentioned earlier), which 
was nationally broadcast on April 8th, two weeks before the people were called to the ballot boxes. To 
our knowledge, President Denktaş of TRNC did not address the population of the Northern sector in 
the same manner, but he did give a speech at a barristers’ convention in Turkey on 6th of April. It has 
been widely referred to that by regional news agencies and compared to that of Papadopoulos in terms 
of its appeal to a rejection of the Annan Plan and its emotive charge, as both have been observed crying 
whilst presenting their viewpoints to the public:  
In separate speeches preceding the election, both Denktaşh and Papadopoulos 
caused something of a stir with their tearful deliveries. Denktaşh cried before a 
meeting of nationalists in Bursa, Turkey; Papadopoulos cried asking the Greek 
Cypriot community to vote no. (..) Denktaş and Papadopoulos were no doubt 
equally sincere in their own tears, but they cried for fear of what they might 
loose198.  
We have no other sources confirming these emotional outbursts, but as we shall demonstrate 
below, both leaders present highly antagonistic representations of the reason for the conflict as well as 
the necessary measure, which will ensure the settlement of it. The following analysis will thus show 
that the arguments of Papadopoulos and Denktaş create contesting configurations of what we shall call 
’the political space of Cyprus’. We shall analyse how the island of Cyprus is a place that the two 
presidents struggle to appropriate discursively through their respective representations of Cyprus’ 
spatial qualities. Using terminology like “representations of spatial qualities” should indicate an 
approach that aims to identify the discursive linkages between human collectivities and landscapes, and 
spatial qualities is here used as an aggregate term for demographic, political and cultural factors which 
are used in explanations of or claims to specific political constellations in Cyprus. The overall purpose 
is to evaluate whether or how Papadopoulos and Denktaş represent Cyprus as a specific space for 
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intervention in the light of the Annan Plan and the 2004 referendums. We shall structure the following 
analysis along the two themes: Representing Cyprus and Evaluating Intervention.    
 
4.7.1 Representing Cyprus 
As mentioned previously, the TRNC has not been acknowledged by international institutions, and 
this is an issue which has implications for the positions of both Papadopoulos. First of all, the question 
of whom Papadopoulos is actually representing as he presents his viewpoints on the Annan Plan is a 
pervasive problem throughout his speech and results in a changing and ambiguous use of vocabulary 
that serves the changes in position which he also makes. He thus switches between speaking as 
President of the Republic of Cyprus and as the “elected representative of the Greek Cypriot 
Community”199. The former position is primarily articulated early in the speech, where he links the 
votes of the general term “Cyprus people” to the responsibility of making history;  
In these conditions of particular historic importance, I feel obliged to address 
myself to you the sovereign Cyprus People. (...) Now the Cyprus people is called 
upon singly and collectively to write the history of the future of Cyprus200. 
It should be noted that in neither this nor other wordings in the speech does Papadopoulos present 
himself explicitly as the representative of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Rather, he refrains from 
directly stating that he speaks as representative of the Turkish Cypriots and allows it to be a matter of 
interpretation whether the population in the northern part of Cyprus, which Papadopoulos views as 
occupied territory, is sovereign along with the Greek Cypriots. It should be noted that in the above 
quotation, Papadopoulos’ metaphor of “writing the history” reflects the perception of the referendum as 
a means of maximising legitimacy and connecting democracy with national self-determination, which 
we have described in section 4.1. He later states that he put the referendum as a condition for resuming 
the negotiations in 2003201. 
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 While the rest of the speech contains a set of terms used to distinguish the interest groups 
involved in the Annan Plan, as we shall show below, this introductory part of the speech does not 
specifically contain definitions of the Cyprus people along ethnical or national lines or the like. 
Considering the very deliberate vocabulary that Papadopoulos generally uses in the speech, this act of 
’non-distinction’ through the general term “Cyprus people” can be interpreted as an expression of the 
fact that Greek Cypriot political leaders have consistently refused to accept any territorial division of 
the island. Therefore, they continue to claim that only the President of the Republic of Cyprus hold the 
capacity of representing the entire population living in Cyprus.  
Denktaş clearly refuses to acknowledge Papadopoulos – or any other Greek Cypriot – as 
representative of Turkish Cypriots. Instead, he refers to “the hi-jacked title of ”Government of 
Cyprus”” as a premise for his criticism of both the claims of Greek Cypriot political leaders and the 
international acknowledgement of the Republic of Cyprus in its current state of affairs202. In this sense, 
Denktaş uses the problem of representation in the same central manner as Papadopoulos in that both 
leaders claim the monopoly of defining the legitimate political space in Cyprus. It is thus not the 
conventional democratic question of ’who’ should represent the political entity, which is at stake here, 
but more fundamentally ’which’ political entity should be represented and in which way? This conflict 
forms the platform upon which all other, more specific points of contention are articulated, such as the 
question of whether Greek Cypriot representatives acknowledge Turkish Cypriots as an ethnic or 
national minority. When bearing in mind that Greek Cypriot political leaders since independence in 
1960 have insisted that Turkish Cypriots can only be perceived as an ethnic minority in Cypriot society 
rather than an equal national group in the Cypriot island, Papadopoulos’ use of the term “Cyprus 
people” can be interpreted as an address to the entire population on the island that does not necessarily 
redefine this perception of the status of the Turkish Cypriots.  
On the other hand, Denktaş consistently refers to Greek Cypriots as “co-partners” in the founding 
Constitution of 1960, while he refers to their status after 1963 until today as that of “ex-partners”. 
Through this approach, he maintains the position that ’the island has two owners, two politically 
independent and equal peoples each with the separate right of self-determination throughout his 
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evaluation of the situation in Cyprus after 24th April203. The foundation of his argument is that 
historical-cultural connections between the place of Cyprus and the population on both ‘sides’ 
legitimise a kind of joint ownership of the place, because “the island of Cyprus was the common home 
of the Turkish and Greek Cypriots alike who should share and have an equal say over its destiny”204. In 
the words of Rupesinghe, this means, that the projects of Papadopoulos and Denktaş not only collide, 
when the question turns to the political organisation in Cyprus, this constitutes the pivotal point. 
Thereby the projects of both leaders fundamentally incorporate the existence of an antagonistic relation 
between Turkish and Greek Cypriots based on the cultural parameters of collective identity such as 
language and religion.  
According to Denktaş, the solution to this problem is actually the fulfilment of his project, the 
acknowledgement of constitutional partition of the island, because “there must be no more futile 
attempts to force unwilling parties together” as he states in a letter to the President of the European 
Council after the Cypriot “No” to the adoption of the draft constitution in the referendum205. He bases 
this claim in the de facto political and military partition of Cyprus, which has been sustained through 
the presence of Turkish military and also through UN peacekeeping forces since 1974, as we have 
described in chapter 2. Since they are no longer co-founding partners in the political construction of 
Cyprus, Denktaş argues that  
The two peoples of Cyprus have over the past forty years developed for themselves 
fully functioning democratic states with modern institutions, and it is time for them 
both to be accepted. Turkish Cypriots can then deal with Greek Cypriots on the 
basis of mutual respect, and with mutual benefit206. 
This solution should imply an even further politically strengthened partition than the bi-zonal 
model of the Annan Plan, which the Greek Cypriots rejected, and according to Denktaş this represents 
a viable model for a stable relation between the two groups, simply because they will remain separated 
and have no direct political influence on each others’ every day lives. Papadopoulos counters this 
perception in the claim that “I committed myself that I would seek a solution that would safeguard the 
interests of the Greek Cypriots but also of the Turkish Cypriots in the framework of a reunited 
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Cyprus”207. The implication is that Papadopoulos discursively establishes a split between the popular 
and political levels in the Northern part of Cyprus, indicating that the TRNC representatives 
negotiating the Annan Plan cannot be viewed as politically legitimate representatives of the Turkish 
Cypriot community. 
Leaders of TRNC by no means accept this view, and a statement from the TRNC Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Defence commenting on the entry of Cyprus into EU takes the bi-zonal argument 
to the limit when claiming that  
(..) it is not legally, politically, or practically possible for the Greek Cypriot 
administration to represent the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus or to exercise 
sovereignty over the island as a whole208. 
This model for peace is, however, not even acknowledged as a possibility by Papadopoulos 
because he does not even accept the somewhat more limited autonomy proposed in the Annan Plan. 
According to Denktaş, this is due to the continued aspiration of the Greek Cypriots to achieve ‘Enosis’, 
i.e. the annexation of Cyprus into the Hellenic state of Greece, which Denktaş describes as the root 
cause for the destruction of the previously mentioned peaceful partnership through the “glaring fact that 
Greek Cypriot leaders had destroyed that partnership in order to annex Cyprus to Greec”’209. On the 
other hand, Papadopoulos represents the Greek Cypriot community and himself as its representative as 
a moderate and realistic negotiating partner that has “(...) submitted consensus proposals which served 
the interests of both sides (...)”, contrasting the “(...) negative stance and the maximalist positions of the 
Turkish side (...)” during the latest series of negotiations210. After the previously mentioned inclusive 
’non-distinction’ between Cypriot ethnicities and the splitting of political leaders from the Turkish 
Cypriot population, Papadopoulos starts conflating his relatively inclusive references to the Turkish 
Cypriot community with the antagonistic “Turkish side” in statements like  
The Turkish Cypriot community gains all the basic demands it made, from the first 
day of the implementation of the solution. (...) Its entity as a ”legal constituent 
state” is recognised. The invasion and occupation are written off. (...) In contrast, 
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everything that the Greek Cypriot community is aspiring to achieve, even from a 
bad and painful solution, are postponed without guarantees (...)211.  
The conflation of the two types of references to Turkish Cypriot collectivities leaves literally no 
room for Papadopoulos’ initial signals that he addresses the public as representative of both 
communities. This means that the initial distinction between TRNC negotiators (’the Turkish side’) and 
the Turkish Cypriot population (the community) is dissolved into one, antagonistic group. At the same 
time, the Greek Cypriot community is represented as the only party with good and compromising 
intentions, seeking a solution for the entire population of the island, one which as mentioned “serves 
the interests of both sides”.  
Not surprisingly, Denktaş likewise represents the Turkish Cypriot population in the same terms 
of being willing to make sacrifices and compromises as Papadopoulos, as he states that  
Well aware of the fact that a peaceful future for the younger generations could not 
be held prisoner to the tragic experiences of the past, the Turkish Cypriots have 
never lost their will or determination for a sound solution which would ensure that 
history would not repeat itself. In was in this spirit that the Turkish Cypriot side 
has always participated in the UN sponsored negotiations aimed at the 
establishments of a new partnership based on the sovereign equality of the two ex-
partners212. 
Here, Denktaş establishes a chain of equivalence between the ’determination’ of the Turkish 
Cypriots to find a “sound solution” and “sovereign equality”. He thereby monopolises the proper 
means to the resolution of the conflict, because the project of establishing two parallel political 
structures is the only possibility acknowledged as a “sound” solution. Denktaş furthermore annexes the 
position of the UN in this quotation, and we shall elaborate on this in the section below, where we take 
a closer look at how the two leaders view the Annan Plan as a process of international intervention.   
4.7.2 Evaluating intervention 
As we shall demonstrate, Papadopoulos clearly and consistently articulates the Annan Plan as an 
intervention which has compromised the interests of Greek Cypriots when evaluating the 5th version of 
the plan as well as the negotiation process throughout his speech, and to a certain extent we can draw a 
parallel to Denktaş’ appropriation of the UN position, which we pointed out above. While 
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Papadopoulos presents several concrete reasons for his reservations against the Annan Plan, we do not 
have material available by Denktaş which discusses the plan in detail. Therefore, we shall allow initial 
space for Papadopoulos concrete criticisms before we draw comparative lines between the statements 
of both presidents on the role and effect of the Annan Plan as a measure of intervention.  
Papadopoulos’ concrete points of critique can be categorised under two main issues which in 
different ways problematise the hypothetical, future spatial qualities of Cyprus implied if the plan were 
to be implemented. Firstly, a range of arguments evolved around the conviction that Cyprus will not be 
able to function as a state under the regulations of the draft constitution. Secondly, he presents 
arguments of concern or dissatisfaction with the future ‘ethnic landscape’ of Cyprus. Regarding the 
first issue, Papadopoulos initially describes the Annan Plan in layman’s terms as “(..) hard to 
understand (..)”213, thereby setting the stage for a general scepticism towards the functionality of the 
political institutions, with regards to both domestic and foreign politics as well as a more technical 
critique of the protracted processes of territorial adjustments and property redistribution214. The 
functionality is partly inhibited by bureaucracy due to “complicated procedures and dangerous 
ambiguities”, but also a due to the granting of “(…) equal participation in the administration of the new 
Federal State, with the status of “co-presidents” [to Turkish Cypriots] (…)”215. The anticipation of 
problems because of their participation in the Federal government is radicalised further to the point 
where joint leadership is predicted to result in the breakdown of the state: 
Without functionality, without an effective procedure to break deadlocks in a 
regime where decisions have to be taken on the basis of equality, i.e. fifty-fifty, 
each side has the opportunity and the possibility to create deadlocks and lead the 
administrative functions of the state to paralysis.  
A paralysis, which if protracted, will inevitably lead to the dissolution of the 
functions of the state, even before the “new state of affairs”, i.e. the new state, is 
implemented216. 
Papadopoulos does not directly ascribe the tendency to create or provoke political deadlocks to 
Turkish Cypriots here, but structurally the quotation is surrounded by claims that the Annan Plan holds 
great uncertainties for and injustices toward the Greek Cypriot people. For instance, Papadopoulos uses 
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the previously mentioned sacrificial inclination of Greek Cypriots to seek a solution despite the fact 
that they view part of their state as occupied, and that any deal per se will be unjust: “That price we are 
willing to pay (..) However, if the solution could not be just, we would at least try for the solution to be 
functional so as to be viable”217. With this point of view immediately preceding his expressions of 
concern for the paralysis of the state, Papadopoulos establishes chains of equivalence between the 
injustice, the lack of functionality, and the participation of Turkish Cypriot representatives in the 
Federal State, without making the direct claim that the opposing party to the Annan Plan negotiations 
will be responsible for the breakdown of the new state from the beginning. The implication is 
strengthened by the subsequent statement where he reminds his audience that ’we should always 
remember that we give everything the Turkish side seeks as from the next day of the referendum, “(..) 
while we have to wait to get things in exchange (..)”, thus reiterating the conflation of Turkish Cypriot 
inhabitants and the antagonistic TRNC leadership, which we identified in the previous section, in a way 
radically undermining his references to the Turkish Cypriot community or compatriots elsewhere in the 
speech218.  
In terms of his concerns for the future ”ethnic landscape” of Cyprus, it is clear that Papadopoulos 
only concerns himself with the problem of division in the population as a territorial one which will 
prevent (Greek) Cypriots in exercising their human rights, although he does not specify these rights 
further219. This  means that his criticism of the method of and restrictions on the property redistribution 
as well as of the lack of “substantive reunification of our country in the economic (..) sector” are all 
arguments against the territorial segmentation of the population, while he later argues against the equal 
influence in political decision making, as we reported above220. Likewise, Papadopoulos argues against 
the fact that citizens of one constituent state will not be allowed to rehears their political rights to e.g. 
vote in for the Senate the other constituent state221. The core effect of these arguments is an objection to 
a reproduction of the current relative ethnic homogeneity in the Northern and Southern sectors under 
the draft constitution of the Annan Plan.  
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As mentioned, Dentkas’ statement discursively appropriates the UN position to be in agreement 
with the Turkish Cypriot perspective, because he claims that the UN sponsored talks have had exactly 
the purpose of establishing a “new partnership” founded on political equality of the two dominant 
communities in Cyprus. In a peculiar way, he actually ends up stating the same perception of the role of 
the UN during negotiations as Papadopoulos, who claims that UN has favoured the interests of Turkish 
Cypriots and that ’the Annan Plan does not abolish the de facto division, but on the contrary, legalizes 
and deepens it’222. This latter remark should be considered in the light of Papadopoulos’ critique that 
the Secretary General demanded the mandate to complete the ’blank spots’ of disagreement in the final 
negotiation of the Annan Plan and that Papadopoulos therefore refuses to take ownership to the plan, 
because  
[the] negative stance and the maximalist positions of the Turkish side but also the 
tolerance the UN exhibited regarding the Turkish demands (...) did not allow for 
substantive negotiations to take place despite our good will223.   
As mentioned, both leaders represent their party as the one offering the ’good will’ to sacrifice, 
but the premises for their evaluations of the Annan Plan are quite divergent.  Denktaş is somewhat 
vague about his perception of the role of the international community in general and UN, because on 
one hand he appropriates the position of the Annan Plan to the Turkish Cypriot stance and on the other, 
he criticizes the maintenance of the long embargo on TRNC which has inhibited the economic growth 
due to the effects of the economic isolation224. In terms of the latter position, he claims that the 
construction of Cyprus in dual political-territorial units is the solution which can ensure a fair economic 
development of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots which is in opposition to the line of reasoning behind 
the argument by Papadopoulos presented above. After the referendum and the Greek Cypriot “No”, 
Denktaş also made the international recognition of TRNC a question of security because  
We cannot afford to give the Greek Cypriots any more time while Turkish Cypriots 
suffer. The time has come for the international community to accept that that the 
two peoples of Cyprus should be freed to live their lives in their own way (...)225 
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In comparison to the status of TRNC, Greek Cypriots have had the official support of the 
international system through the formal recognition, but nevertheless Papadopoulos is highly critical 
towards the intervention orchestrated by the UN and the Secretary General, as mentioned above. He 
even goes as far as speaking of the Annan Plan as dangerous, due to its proposal of a consociational 
model where Turkish Cypriots will be influential at the Federal level (see 4.3.1). This meant that he 
expressed less fear of the “(...) possible repercussions from the rejection (...)” than of the “(...) dangers 
the Annan Plan entails (...)”226 which definitively writes of the Annan Plan as a form of intervention 
that can have any positive impact on the future spatial qualities of Cyprus in terms of political 
structures and security. Therefore, he finally encouraged his constituency not to be “(...) scared by 
threats about alleged international isolation (...)” and not least to “(...) defend your dignity, your history 
and what is right”, which reiterated the split between the interests of the Greek Cypriot community and 
those of the international system, which had been asked to supervise the resumption of the negotiations 
back in 2003227. So, in the final rejection of the Annan Plan at the referendum, Papadopoulos and 
Denktaş found a second thing to agree upon, namely the relief that the plan was not to be implemented, 
which Denktaş clearly expressed in his statement that  
I am not saddened with the result. I am happy after getting rid of a heavy burden. 
(..) I declared it [the Annan Plan] ’dead’ once, but it was resurrected again like 
Jesus. But, I think it is not possible to do that for the second time228.     
Neither of the two leaders thus acknowledges the result of the Annan Plan strategy as a 
constructive form of intervention which will serve the interests of the groups they represent 
respectively.  As we have shown above, Papadopoulos claimed that the plan was not beneficial to either 
group, due to the processes of decision making and security issue, whereas Denktaş denied that the plan 
could be beneficial to the Turkish Cypriots229.   
4.8 Summary 
At this point we may think back to Uleri’s statement presented early in this chapter that 
referendums are a kind of democratic decision making which can both function as a kind of escape 
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from difficult decisions for politicians or put pressure on them. From this perspective, we can conclude 
that the April referendum has served to intensify the political atmosphere in both sectors of Cyprus, but 
in different ways and with different effects on the final result of the referendum. In terms of the 
mobilisation and popular participation in the decision whether or not to establish a common political 
system in Cyprus, we find that both Papadopoulos and Denktaş have attempted to mobilise public 
opinion through highly nationalistic campaigns and expressed viewpoints and ideas for solutions which 
incorporated the antagonistic relation between Greek and Turkish Cypriots and therefore did not offer 
ideas for radically transforming the conflict and redefining the problem in terms that could facilitate 
concrete negotiations.  
The difference between the two leaders is that Papadopoulos has had a much wider support for 
his campaign, while Denktaş appears to have failed thoroughly in this. This is shown in the fact that 
only one very small party in the Southern sector ended up advocating the constitution of the Annan 
Plan, with even the traditionally ”pro-cooperation” government party AKEL recommending a ’no’ to 
the plan. In the Northern sector, even Prime Minister Talat of TRNC went against Denktaş advocating 
the Annan Plan and was actually elected in December 2003 on the basis of this viewpoint. So while the 
negotiations under the Annan Plan and the referendum led to a high degree of popular participation in 
both sectors and high turn outs for the referendum, the majority in each sector can be said to have 
mobilised for Papadopoulos and against Denktaş.  
On the one hand, both furthermore appear to have certain problems of legitimacy because they 
functioned as chief negotiators and nevertheless refused ownership to the result. This means that they 
were unwilling to follow the path laid out in the Annan Plan that, as mentioned, they expressed in 
rather strong words with Denktaş calling the plan a heavy burden and Papadopoulos even calling it 
dangerous. Therefore, the referendum did have the potential to undermine the legitimacy of their 
rejection and instead redefine the premises for political interaction. On the other, the rejectionist 
stances of Papadopoulos and Denktaş also weakened the legitimacy of the plan as a viable peace plan. 
Along the same lines, the legally binding referendum in fact forced the UN to accept the defeat of their 
strategy to transform the conflict and the premises for interaction between Cypriots of Turkish and 
Greek affiliation.   
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From the viewpoints presented in these texts by the two presidents, we can conclude that they 
discursively made use of the same technique of representing Greek and Turkish Cypriots in cultural 
essentialist terms and their mutual implicit or explicit representations of the opposing party as the one 
refusing or preventing real compromises implied that the two ethnic groups were associated with an 
antagonism that did not open up for the negotiation of a common identity for the two groups. This 
means that neither president articulated a common Cypriot national identity as the primary mark of 
identification for the population inhabiting the island, which could otherwise discursively function as 
an enabling identity under which the questions of political representation and organisation could be 
subsumed and transformed. We do not claim that this discursively technique is unique to these two 
political leaders, as it has been frequently put to use in intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era 
(see Rupesinghe 1996). It did, however, function as a symbolic and emotive legitimation of the refusal 
to reformulate the projects in ways that will make a real de-securitisation of the political space in 
Cyprus possible.  
Furthermore, Papadopoulos spoke against maintaining the current relative ethnic homogeneity in 
the Northern and Southern sectors, but he did not appear to consider problems of social and ethnic 
stratification such as those outlined by Rupesinghe. Rupesinghe describes different ways in which 
social and ethnic stratification can be combined in multi-ethnic societies and particularly points out that 
’ethnic and social conflict coincide when ethnicity and class coincide in ranked systems’ (Rupesinghe 
1996:16). When speaking of the viability of the settlement of the Cyprus conflict, Papadopoulos did not 
acknowledge the risk that free economic and political mobility between the constituent states could 
lead to the correlation of ethnic and social stratification, due to the great differences in levels of GDP 
per capita between the two sectors at present (see section 3.3). This situation indicates that more 
economically resourceful Greek Cypriots could have achieved a status of social and political elite, if no 
restrictions were placed on their access to economic and political sectors of the Northern constituent 
state, but Papadopoulos chooses to focus on the lack of political and economic mobility as a general 
problem relating to the protection of human rights. In opposition to this idea, Denktaş suggested that 
the international community should allow and facilitate the development of two parallel societies with 
each their territorial sovereignty as well, which would lead to two systems of social stratification within 
each ethnic group. This shows that the two presidents, who do not accept each other’s claims for the 
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representative capacity, connect the antagonistic elements of their representations of Turkish and Greek 
Cypriot identities to ideals for specific types of economic relations for the population in the island.  
In the following chapter, we shall outline our overall conclusions, drawing lines between the 
discussions and conclusions made throughout the report, and linking all the aspects analysed using the 
model presented in chapter 1. 
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5 Conclusion 
We will here summarize some aspects of our work, giving also some opinions based on our 
analyses and discussions of the present situation and choices that has been made by the actors involved 
in the Annan Plan and the referendum. In order to understand something more about the present 
situation we have also to consider the historical events that led to that. 
Our historical starting point has been the entry into force of the “Constitution of the Republic of 
Cyprus”, signed in 1960. For the first time the population in Cyprus had the independence from an 
external actor, as Great Britain ended its colonial regime. The Constitution had to deal particularly with 
the problem of the ethnic power distribution, since there were basically two dominant ethnic groups on 
the island.  
After having studied the Constitution of 1960 (we wrote about this topic in section 3.1), we try 
here to point out some possible reasons why that document did not function as a mediation of the 
interests of Greek and Turkish Cypriots. The constitution of 1960 was political system based on power 
sharing, but it had two important problems, namely the lack of legitimacy230 and the absence of 
territorial autonomy for the two different communities.  
However, before the constitution of 1960, the Cypriots had never experienced the possibility to 
rule about themselves, and the pressures coming from Greece and Turkey has often been strong, 
conditioning the attitude of national politicians. The delicate relationship between the “motherlands” of 
the two main ethnic communities in Cyprus also made the relationship between the local politicians of 
the two groups different. The ethnic quota system of the Constitution has given, according to the Greek 
politicians, too much power to the Turkish minority, and this brought about an attempt of changing the 
constitution in 1964. In this change of the Constitution the power of the Greek part was supposed to 
increase. The system had, in our opinion, a difficulty in a society like the Cypriot one, because the veto 
by the two communities could result in deadlocks in the political decision making processes. 
The ethnic division has remained a problem up to nowadays and been reinforced by the Turkish 
intervention in 1974. The attempts made by the UN in order to solve the Cyprus problem have often 
faced, for various reasons, opposition by national politicians. As we know how the Annan plan defined 
                                                 
230 This was also underlined by Anna Jarstadt (2001)   
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the conditions of the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in proposed federal state, we can see that 
rejection of the Greek Cypriots politicians can be due to speculations about another plan, which can be 
created in the future. Negotiators on both sides also rejected a similar plan in the negotiations of 1992 
but we know now from the referendum in April 2004 that the majority of Turkish Cypriots, against the 
elected leader Denktaş, this time agree with the solution proposed by the UN.  
In the model “Space for intervention” we find the UN playing the mediation role as the third 
party in the Cypriot conflict. The UN defined the problem and headed the negotiations step by step in 
each matter with both leaders in order to reach an acceptable solution for both parties. The UN used 
and still uses the role of the Secretary-General as the highest power to lead the negotiations with full 
support of the Security Council as well as the UN use multinational forces to restore and maintain order 
and law locally in Cyprus.  
The aim of the UN was to terminate the intervention on the island. “Successful peacemaking is 
the product of various coordinated interventions carried out over time by official and unofficial actors 
working at all levels of society”.231 In comparison to the more politically passive peacekeeping 
approach, we see a change in the preceding two decades. In the period between the establishment of the 
UN mission in Cyprus in 1964 and the moment in which the Turkish troops intervened in 1974, the UN 
intervention was basically based on keeping the ceasefire between the two communities. There was no 
border, so the attempt to keep the two parts separated was complex. The situation collapsed in 1974 
with the Turkish intervention that brought to a military occupancy of the current TRNC. This changed 
the UN form of intervention, which focused now on the management of the border, creating a buffer 
zone and trying to facilitate contacts between the two parts. The logic was still the one of the so called 
“First Generation” (as explained in chapter 2) of UN peacekeeping intervention, with a traditional 
military role, and an acceptance of the separation and of the ethnic cleaning that characterized that 
period.  
From 1992 the intervention of the UN followed a more comprehensive approach, since there has 
been the idea to focus also on a political solution of the conflict, and not just a passive role of 
maintaining the ceasefire. The “Good Office” of the UN of 1992 is characterized by an attempt to 
create an agreement about a federal state in Cyprus, but the outcome was not reached. This period can 
                                                 
231 Rasmussen L.J.: Peacekeeping in International Conflict, p.43 
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also be analyzed as a shift to the “Second Generation” in the form of intervention the UN implement in 
Cyprus.  
The Annan Plan is in the concept of Space for intervention the latest measure to solve by the UN 
the Cyprus problem. It also passed to the cluster three, because it involved participation of the 
inhabitants of the island in the referendum. The plan names them - Greek and Turkish communities - as 
one Cypriot nation and gives them same flag, symbols and primarily common soil, land and state.   
It is possible to find an imbalance in the perception of the plan’s importance. On the one hand, 
the Greek Cypriot leader Papadopoulos described it as “one possible solution”, but on the other hand, 
UN defined it as “the last and ultimate solution”.  
The draft of the Annan Plan started with the negotiations in the year 2000 and it is based on the 
comprehensive approach from 1992 that involves legal and structural aspects, and try to find a 
compromise for the ethnical power distribution that based on the present situation.  In the Annan Plan 
also a constitution is proposed, negotiated by the two parts, but also filled in by UN political scientists. 
The people’s participation is guaranteed by the referendum to confirm of the Constitution.  
The management of the land was also very important. The problem of territorial division and the 
management of the property issues are very complicated aspects of the Annan plan. We described it 
comprehensibly in chapter three and identify some problems in the plan.   
In our model in cluster 4, where belong our analysis of speeches by president Papadopoulos and 
president Dektash, the interests were in psychical and psychological security of identity. We think that 
a part of the Plan that has played a key role in the decision of the people of the Greek sector, has been 
the acceptance by the Plan of the Treaty of Guarantee that allows the Turk troops to stay on the island 
because it was represented by Papadopoulos as a continuation of a Turkish threat according to Greek 
Cypriots life and identity.  
We focused on the speeches made by the presidents and chief negotiators of both sides, in 
relation to the referendums of April 2004, which could have led to unifying the island politically after 
40 years of hostilities. First of all, we think it is necessary to stress that there has been, and continues to 
be a problem of representation of the Turkish Cypriots. On the one hand, the TRNC is not recognized 
by any other state than Turkey, and the UN cannot acknowledge technically Denktaş as a legitimate 
state leader. On the other hand, we find that Papadopoulos initially claims to represent all citizens of 
Cyprus in his speech to the nation before the referendum, but it soon became clear that he spoke mainly 
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on behalf of the Greek Cypriot community and clearly defined the “Turkish side” as the opponent that 
had no legitimate claims to control the land in Cyprus. Papadopoulos also states that the fifth version of 
the Plan is strongly in favor of the Turkish Cypriots. 
The kind of arguments that he has used in order to convince the people not to accept the plan is 
connected with security, economy and also with the entrance into the EU. Furthermore, he often 
stressed that the last version of the Plan had realized every request by the Turkish Cypriots, and that it 
was a disadvantage for Greek Cypriots.  
The main actor that we have analyzed concerning the Turkish party representing the Northern 
sector of the island is President Denktaş. He was basically skeptic about the plan and about a possible 
reunification and ended up rejecting it. Whereas the majority of the Greek Cypriot politicians follow 
Papadopoulos against the “Yes” to the referendum to approve the Annan Plan, the latest political 
election in TRNC showed that the majority of the Turkish Cypriot population did not support Denktaş 
and mainly voted on parties supporting unification and the Annan plan. There have also been several 
and widespread public demonstration in favor of the Plan. Consequently, we can hypothesize that, 
during the negotiations between, Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders mediated by the UN, the Turkish 
Cypriots were not well represented by Denktaş. He was pushing for a solution strongly in favor of the 
Turkish part. In the same time, most of the people may have accepted a more compromising solution, 
in order to make also the Greek Cypriots accept the Annan Plan.  
In the cluster three of our model we are speaking about the elements of the conflict. We find in 
geopolitical point of view a big accumulation of interest, above all because strategical position of the 
island in the Mediterranean Sea and the location of two British military bases. If we look at important 
external international actors in the process of the solution of the Cyprus problem, it is remarkable how 
Greece behaved in relation with the vote for the Annan Plan. Even if they historically have always been 
of the most important players, they have not taken an official position about the vote in the 
referendums. Our hypothesis is that Greece was basically against the Plan, but it was also trying not to 
have a position that was isolated, being in disagreement with EU, US and the dominant UN.  
The Annan Plan has to be evaluated, bearing in mind that it is the most recent attempt made by 
the UN, but it is just part of a 40-years-long presence of the UN on the island (as we describe in chapter 
2). The UN as representing international society, works with pressure of the political interest represent 
Greece, Turkey, the UK and the US as ally in NATO and supporter of the Turkey. This doesn’t mean 
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that they finish their mission to find possible solution to end off their presence in the island. The 
situation in the Buffer zone is calm, and present number of the deployment forces will be decrease as 
mentioned before. One possibilities can be as well recognized by the international community present 
TRNC. This would meet the ultimate goal as Denktaş has sought it, but this would also undermine the 
role of the UN as a third party, which could effectively transform the conflict by making the conflicting 
parties redefine their goal, as is the concept of 2nd generation peacekeeping. We find that the 
viewpoints expressed by the two presidents signal that the territorial control is the key point of collision 
between their projects, because it deals with both the issues of identity and physical and economic 
mobility across the present border. This is also a structural question of how or if the ethnic stratification 
should be controlled. From the statements analyzed in this report, we find that Papadopoulos clearly 
opposes such a control through both power sharing in the political system and territorial division, as the 
Annan Plan proposes. Denktaş, on the contrary, proposes a division that is even stronger than suggested 
in the Annan Plan.  
If we will be witnesses of the historical reunification of the island some day, will depend on 
whether the future negotiating parties will be willing and able to redefine the projects of the 
communities, they claim to represent, and avoid impinging on each other. 
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Final considerations 
Analysing conflicts as well as attempts at solving them is a highly complex matter and a 
systematic analysis of this necessarily demands focusing on certain aspects and neglecting others. 
Rupesinghe’s perception of conflicts as collisions of projects, which we have used as an overall 
framework for our work, aims to integrate issues of identity politics and socio-economic stratification 
in the evaluation of how a conflict develops the way it does and the structural causes of this.  
In this report, we have limited ourselves to analysing systematically the aspects of the Annan 
Plan which mainly pertain to the connection between identity politics and territorial control. We have 
also discussed the role of economic interests in the result of the referendum, and now we would like to 
outline some economic arguments about the reasons why the majority of Greek Cypriots voted “no”.  
The limited integration of the Northern and Southern economic sectors and the restricted mobility 
of persons for up to 19 years could be a significant reason for the rejection of the plan. It severely limits 
the access of Greek Cypriots to the economic development, which could probably be expected in the 
Northern sector, if the island had joined EU as united. The economic gap between the two sectors of 
Cyprus shows in itself that the Turkish part, economically, can have a stronger interest. Rejecting the 
plan, Cypriots in the Southern sector would be sure to enter the EU, as a relatively rich member, 
without the economic pressure and risk of instability, which a reunification of the island would 
probably imply initially.  
Also, there is an actual risk that the increased access for people and businesses in the Northern 
sector to the European market, combined with the restricted access of Greek Cypriots to the markets of 
the Turkish Cypriot constituent state could actually result in businesses competing against each other 
”across the border”. Then, competition within economic sectors and branches could become defined 
along the territorial, and therefore implicitly ethnic boundary, which could easily be the case in the 
tourist industry.  
Tourism is important for both areas but maintaining the boundary between the proposed 
constituent states could lead to a decrease of income and to a lost position of the Greeks Cypriot 
seaside resorts to a cheaper Turkish Cypriots coast. We have to keep in mind that the Northern Part has 
more than a half of the coastline of the island. They did not have a big development in this sector 
mainly because of the isolation they suffered after the 1970s. 
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Switching to another angle, one could also argue that the opening of the border could result, from 
the viewpoint of the Greek Cypriots, in a pressure in the labour market, caused by the workers coming 
from the Northern part. This could have been also a reason for a rejection by the Southern part. The 
movements could be justified by the gap in the wages, but in the case of an acceptance of the 
Foundation Agreement, also in possible higher unemployment in the Turkish Cypriot Constituent State. 
Nowadays, the official unemployment rate in the TRNC is very low, but it could have increased in the 
case of an implementation of the Annan Plan, especially because of the border adjustment. Giving 
more land to the Southern sector, would mean a loss of arable land for the Northern sector, which 
employs app. 15% of the work force. This could be clear and understandable reason to vote “No”, 
because the land is also an important aspect of the self-definition of nations. Nevertheless, a high 
percentage of “Yes”-votes was also registered in the areas subject to territorial adjustment.  
Generally, it is more difficult to find reasons for the Greek Cypriots to vote “Yes”, except reasons 
connected with the properties. Moreover, it is necessary to stress also that the Greek Cypriots’ “No” 
has been motivated by “security” reasons. Maybe it is not a merely “fear”, but it can be a rational 
consideration about the risks. Part of these risks can be also connected with the way in which UN 
managed the negotiation process that brought about the Foundation Agreement. The plan did not have 
the support of the president of neither sector and could maybe have been interpreted as a possible risky 
situation, after what happened in 1960 when the process was also highly influenced by external actors.  
Concluding, after our reads and discussion, the refusal by the Greek Cypriots, that seemed to be 
quite surprising, seems now less so. Facing this decision process, the majority of the Greek Cypriots 
could have been conservative, in the sense of fear to change a situation, to a new “state of affairs” that 
can present more risks than the current status quo. 
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Appendix 1  
 
Countries providing military and civilian police personnel 
(Contingent by country of origin, as at 31 December 1964) 
 
  Countries  military personnel 
  Austria   48 
  Canada   1129 
  Denmark   996 
  Finland   955 
  Ireland   1059 
  Sweden   849 
  United Kingdom  1030 
 
Total   6066 
 
  Countries        civilian police 
  Australia   39 
  Austria   34 
  Denmark   40 
  New Zealand  19 
  Sweden   40 
 
  Total   172 
   
  Grand Total                  6238
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Appendix 2  
 
Countries providing military and civilian police personnel 
(Contingent by country of origin, as at 24 September 2004) 
 
  Countries    military personnel 
  Argentina*   403 
  Austria   7 
  Canada   1 
  Finland   3 
  Hungary   121 
  Ireland   2 
  Slovakia   275 
  United Kingdom  412 
Total   1224 
* The Argentine contingent includes soldiers from Bolivia 
(2), Brazil (2), Chile (32), Paraguay (32), Peru (2), 
Uruguay (3) 
 
  Countries                 civilian police 
  Australia   15 
  India   6 
  Ireland   19 
  Netherlands   4 
Total    44 
   
  Grand Total                 1268
A Failed Attempt of Conflict Resolution: The Case of Cyprus 
 
 105
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 3: Map of Deployment 2004
